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The FCC and the “Pre-Internet”
JOHN BLEVINS
Network neutrality has dominated broadband policy debates for the past decade.
While important, network neutrality overshadows other policy levers that are equally
important to the goals of better, cheaper, and more open broadband service. This
lack of perspective has historical precedent—and understanding this history can help
refocus today’s policy debate. In the 1960s and 1970s, telephone companies
threatened the growth of the nascent data industry. The FCC responded with a series
of rulemakings known as the “Computer Inquiries” proceedings. In the literature,
Computer Inquiries enjoys hallowed status as a key foundation of the Internet’s rise.
This Article, however, argues that Computer Inquiries is less important than it
seems. A series of lesser-known FCC proceedings was more important to the
development of the “pre-Internet”—a term I use to describe the ancestral data
networks that ultimately evolved into the Internet. When viewed in historical context,
Computer Inquiries did not create growth, but instead reflected the growth that the
pre-Internet proceedings had already unleashed. Computer Inquiries, however,
contributed to the pre-Internet in other ways that the literature overlooks.
Specifically, it became a crucial source of information that influenced the more
important pre-Internet proceedings. Understanding how the FCC helped build the
pre-Internet also provides important lessons for today’s modern policy debates. One
implication is that today’s open Internet depended not upon “light touch” restraint,
but upon aggressive regulatory enforcement over many years. It also illustrates how
the current policy debate focuses too narrowly on network neutrality rules to the
exclusion of other proceedings and policy levers that can construct a larger
“habitat” of innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
Network neutrality dominates broadband policy debates today. While strong
network neutrality rules are necessary, the debates often overshadow equally
important issues that are critical to the future of American broadband. Network
neutrality rules, for instance, cannot empower cities to build blazing fast fiber
networks. They cannot secure adequate spectrum for “super Wi-Fi” that enables the
next generation of wireless innovation. They also do little to address broadband costs,
which limit adoption and contribute to the “digital divide” that many low-income
and rural communities experience. In short, network neutrality is important, but it’s
not the only game in town.
This disproportionate focus on a single proceeding, however, is not new. A similar
lack of perspective exists regarding the FCC’s role in the early history of the Internet.
Specifically, the literature gives too much credit to a single set of FCC rules for
encouraging the Internet’s growth. As a result, it overlooks several lesser-known
proceedings and enforcement efforts that contributed more heavily to building the
“pre-Internet”—a term I use to describe the early data networks that ultimately
evolved into the Internet. Understanding this history can help refocus today’s policy
debates. In particular, it can remind us that the FCC possesses a diverse toolkit of
policy levers—not merely one high-profile set of rules—to achieve its goals of better,
cheaper, and faster Internet service.
This history begins in the 1960s when the growth of computer services created
several regulatory challenges for the FCC. One problem was that fledgling “data”
services increasingly relied on telephone networks to reach customers.1 At the same
time, telephone carriers expressed interest in entering new data markets themselves.
It was unclear how to regulate any of this activity—and history provided little
guidance. Data services had never been regulated at all, while the FCC had
extensively regulated telephone networks as common carriers for decades.2 Neither
approach, however, seemed to fit the new technological realities.
The FCC looked for answers in a series of regulatory proceedings in the 1960s
and 1970s collectively known as the Computer Inquiries proceedings. Computer
Inquiries enjoys hallowed status in the literature as a necessary condition of the
Internet’s subsequent growth.3 The literature especially celebrates Computer

1. Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Servs. & Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 11 (1966) (notice of inquiry) [hereinafter
Computer I NOI]; Bernard Strassburg, Competition and Monopoly in the Computer and Data
Transmission Industries, 13 ANTITRUST BULL., 991, 993 (1968).
2. See GERALD W. BROCK, THE SECOND INFORMATION REVOLUTION 139 (2003).
3. Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer
Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 169 (2003) (stating that Computer Inquiries proceedings
“were a necessary precondition for the success of the Internet”); Kevin Werbach, The Network
Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1805–06 (2011) (“The modern PC and Internet markets developed
as a direct result of the FCC’s actions in Computer I.”); see also infra notes 70–73 and
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Inquiries’ “layered” regulatory approach, which combined elements of both
regulation and deregulation.4 Under this layered regime, the FCC deregulated the
new data services “on top.” At the lower layer, however, the FCC continued to
regulate the physical telephone infrastructure to protect the burgeoning data industry.
In short, the FCC protected new cars by regulating only the roads.
Because of its perceived success, the literature often cites Computer Inquiries to
justify both regulatory and deregulatory policies. For instance, some scholars
emphasize the deregulatory aspects of Computer Inquiries, noting the wisdom of
government restraint in dynamic new markets.5 Other scholars, by contrast, celebrate
Computer Inquiries’ regulatory interventions, which protected the nascent data
industry from discrimination.6 The shared assumption throughout the literature,
however, is that Computer Inquiries was important and a key source of growth for
early computer services. This Article challenges these assumptions.
The first argument is that Computer Inquiries is receiving credit for developments
made possible by other contemporary FCC proceedings. During the 1960s and
1970s, the telephone network was inadequate for newer computer technologies.
Transmission service was too slow and too expensive. Carriers also imposed
numerous restrictions that stifled new data services and equipment.7 The FCC
responded with a diverse range of proceedings and enforcement efforts (collectively
the “pre-Internet proceedings”) that addressed these concerns.8 The pre-Internet
proceedings pressured carriers to open their networks and to accommodate new
competitors. They also created new freedoms for customers to attach devices, to
interconnect with private networks, and to share and resell communications
services.9 Collectively, these actions had more tangible effects in the formative era
of the 1960s and 1970s than Computer Inquiries’ more celebrated regulatory
decisions, which the FCC did not adopt in final form until 1980.10
Computer Inquiries, however, was not irrelevant to the rise of the Internet. Indeed,
a second argument is that Computer Inquiries contributed to the pre-Internet in ways
the literature overlooks—namely, as an informational source for the pre-Internet
proceedings. The voluminous comments in Computer Inquiries publicly
documented—for the first time—the inadequacy of telephone networks and services
for modern computer services. This dissatisfaction pressured carriers (particularly
AT&T) to reform their services, and strongly influenced the other pre-Internet
proceedings that invalidated carrier restrictions and opened the telephone network to

accompanying text (discussing the legacy of Computer Inquiries).
4. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part II.A–B.
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 387 (1980) (final decision) [hereinafter Computer II
Final Decision].
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new uses.11 This Article defends this claim with primary historical documents from
the FCC archives that have never been identified in the literature.12
A third argument is that the more famous aspects of Computer Inquiries—its
celebrated regulations—are less important than they seem. The literature, I argue,
inverts the relationship of Computer Inquiries and the pre-Internet’s growth. When
viewed in historical context, Computer Inquiries is an effect of growth rather than a
cause. In many instances, it merely reflected either pre-existing norms or the legal
and market reforms that the pre-Internet proceedings had already unleashed.
A related argument is that this history undermines the modern literature’s use of
Computer Inquiries to justify certain deregulatory and regulatory policies.
Deregulatory advocates ignore the often unspoken assumptions that the underlying
physical network would remain extensively regulated.13 Regulatory advocates, by
contrast, overinterpret Computer Inquiries’ regulatory interventions. Contrary to its
legacy in the literature, the final Computer Inquiries order was arguably a
deregulatory effort to help AT&T expand into competitive markets. Indeed, the
FCC’s reliance on both “unbundling” and ancillary jurisdiction arguably reduced
regulation to facilitate AT&T’s expansion.14
A final contribution is that the pre-Internet’s history provides insights into today’s
broadband policy debates. First, it contradicts claims that the Internet’s growth
depended upon a “light touch” deregulatory approach.15 In reality, the Internet’s
growth relied upon aggressive regulatory intervention, but only at the physical layer
(which was less competitive). In this respect, the pre-Internet history lends normative
support for both network neutrality rules in general, and Title II16 reclassification
approaches specifically. It also reinforces—through new historical examples—the
arguments of scholars who have recognized the regulatory foundations of the
Internet’s development.17
The pre-Internet’s history also teaches us that today’s open Internet depends not
merely upon a single proceeding, but upon a larger “habitat” of innovation that
encompasses a diverse set of proceedings and policy levers. Focusing too heavily on
one aspect of this habitat potentially diverts resources from other valuable initiatives.
For instance, I argue that the credible threat of new competition was the single most
important factor in motivating carriers to improve their networks in ways that

11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See, e.g., Motion for Official Notice [of the First Computer Inquiry], Application of
Microwave Commc’ns, Inc., No. 16509-19 (F.C.C. May 5, 1968); see also infra Part II.C.1
(discussing additional documents from the FCC archives).
13. The concept of background assumptions is similar to James Joll’s historical analysis
of the “unspoken assumptions” of World War I. JAMES JOLL, 1914: THE UNSPOKEN
ASSUMPTIONS (1968). See Stuart Lloyd Mathison & Philip M. Walker, Public Policy Issues
Arising from the Interdependence of Computers and Communication (1968) (unpublished
master’s thesis) (on file with National Archives, FCC Docket No. 16979); see also infra
Part III.B.2.
14. See infra notes 295 and 324–25 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
16. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–231 (2012).
17. See infra note 353.
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benefited innovative data services.18 The analogue today is that enabling municipal
broadband projects and private projects such as Google Fiber19 is perhaps the most
effective means to pressure providers to increase speeds, lower costs, and improve
service.
Part I provides an overview of Computer Inquiries and summarizes the current
literature. Part II describes the FCC’s pre-Internet proceedings that created the
foundation for data services’ growth. Part III argues that the Computer Inquiries
regulatory decisions themselves are less consequential than the literature recognizes,
and examines how the historical record complicates traditional narratives
surrounding these proceedings. Part IV considers the relevance of this history to
modern policy disputes, particularly broadband access regulation.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER INQUIRIES
This section provides a brief summary of the two major Computer Inquiries
proceedings known as Computer I20 and Computer II.21 It then summarizes the
literature’s traditional account of Computer Inquiries and its layered regulatory
model.22

18. See infra Part II.C.2.
19. A Different Kind of Internet and TV, GOOGLE FIBER, https://fiber.google.com/about/
[https://perma.cc/CY35-WR3E].
20. The Computer I proceeding includes the following major actions from Docket No.
16979: Computer I NOI, supra note 1; Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the
Interdependence of Computer & Commc’n Servs. & Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 19 (1967)
(supplemental notice of inquiry); Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the
Interdependence of Computer & Commc’ns Servs. & Facilities, 17 F.C.C.2d 587 (1969)
(report and further notice of inquiry) [hereinafter Computer I 1969 Further Notice]; Regulatory
& Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer & Commc’n Servs. &
Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) (tentative decision) [hereinafter Computer I Tentative
Decision]; Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer &
Commc’n Servs. & Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) (final decision and order) [hereinafter
Computer I Final Decision].
21. The Computer II proceeding includes the following major actions from Docket No.
20828: Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations, 61 F.C.C.2d
103 (1976) (notice of inquiry and proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter Computer II Notice];
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Computer Inquiry), 64
F.C.C.2d 771 (1977) (supplemental notice) [hereinafter Computer II Supp. Notice];
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Second Computer
Inquiry), 72 F.C.C.2d 358 (1979) (tentative decision and further notice) [hereinafter Computer
II Tentative Decision]; Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10; Amendment of Section
64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 84 F.C.C.2d 50
(1980) (memorandum opinion and order) [hereinafter Computer II Reconsideration Order].
Materials from these FCC Dockets are filed at the National Archives in College Park,
Maryland, and are on file with the author.
22. This Article focuses on the first and second Computer Inquiries proceedings. The third
proceeding—known as Computer III—is discussed in Part IV.C, infra. Amendment of
Sections 64.702 of the Commc’ns Rules & Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104
F.C.C.2d 958 (1986).
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A. Brief History of Computer Inquiries
1. Computer I (1966–1971)
The story of Computer Inquiries begins with the evolution of computers. Early
computers were massive, expensive mainframes that provided limited processing and
programming functions. To use these computers, people had to physically travel to
the computer.23 During this time, the telephone network was largely irrelevant to
early mainframe computers.
In the 1960s, several developments caused telephone networks to become a vital
component of computer services. The most important was the rise of remote access
services that telephone lines made possible. With remote access, users could access
and share computers from different locations.24 Further, owners of large mainframe
units (such as banks and large retail stores) could lease out idle computer capacity to
other users.25 Remote access also became more widespread because computing costs
declined steadily in this period, even before Intel introduced its first microprocessor
in the early 1970s.26
Collectively, these developments gave rise to a new “data services” industry that
provided remote access to various business customers. Stockbrokers could quickly
retrieve price information. Hotels and airlines could use computer technology for
processing reservations and payroll records.27 While data services initially served
business clients, contemporary observers realized their potential in the future. For
instance, J.C.R. Licklater and Robert Taylor offered strikingly prescient predictions
of how computer networks would evolve to connect people.28 It was an exciting time.

23. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. Revisions to Tariffs FCC Nos. 260 and 267 Relating to Dataspeed
40R, 62 F.C.C.2d 21, 27–28 (1977) [hereinafter Dataspeed Order] (memorandum opinion and
order); see also GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 726–27 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing the
evolution of the computer up to 1973); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for
Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1987) (discussing contemporary computer
technology).
24. John R. Bonica, A Re-Examination of the Computer Inquiry, 7 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 23, 25–26 (1979); Lynn Hopewell, Computer Communications: An
Introduction and Overview, in COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS 1, 10–16 (1976); Manley
R. Irwin, Computers and Communications: The Economics of Interdependence, 34 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 360, 360–61 (1969).
25. Computer I NOI, supra note 1, at 12; Comments of National Retail Association, in
ANDREW J. LIPINSKI, DIGESTS OF THE RESPONSES TO THE FCC COMPUTER INQUIRY (1969)
[hereinafter COMPUTER I DIGESTS].
26. BROCK, supra note 2, at 95.
27. Computer I NOI, supra note 1, at 12–13.
28. J.C.R. Licklater & Robert W. Taylor, The Computer as a Communications Device,
SCI. & TECH., Apr. 1968, at 21, 21, reprinted in SYS. RESEARCH CTR., RESEARCH REPORT 61,
IN MEMORIAM: J.C.R. LICKLIDER 1915–1990, at 21, 21 (1990), available at
http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/Compaq-DEC/SRC-RR-61.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NF9
-GSG2] (“In a few years, men will be able to communicate more effectively through a machine
than face to face. That is a rather startling thing to say, but it is our conclusion.”).
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The brave new world of data services, however, depended completely upon
telephone networks to link users and computers.29 Early data services used “private
lines,” which were dedicated point-to-point lines that were not interconnected with
the public telephone network. Companies would lease a private line, generally from
the Bell System or Western Union. This line provided dedicated “always on” access
to remote computers.30 Over time, users began accessing data services through the
publicly switched telephone network (PSTN)31 through the use of a modem or
coupling device. Unlike the high-capacity private lines that businesses purchased,
public “dial-up” services could bring computing to the general public.32
Telephones and computers developed in two very different regulatory
environments. The telephone network was a common carrier utility service, regulated
extensively under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934.33 Computers, by
contrast, developed in a “self-contained” parallel environment free from such
regulation.34 As the technologies began converging, it raised difficult regulatory
questions.35 To address these questions, the FCC opened a proceeding called “the
Computer Inquiry” in 1966.36 It would later be known as Computer I.
Computer I’s initial notice of inquiry requested information on nearly a dozen
different topics. In time, its focus narrowed to four primary issues: (1) the costs and
adequacy of common carrier networks for new data services; (2) whether common
carriers should be allowed to provide data services; (3) whether data providers should
be allowed to offer communications services; and (4) the privacy of data.37 The
response was overwhelming. Thousands of pages of comments were filed by carriers,
data services providers, business customers, and state and federal regulators. The
comments were so voluminous that the FCC hired the Stanford Research Institute
(SRI) to analyze and summarize them in a series of reports published in 1969.38

29. Bernard Strassburg, The Computer Utility—Some Regulatory Implications, 9
JURIMETRICS J. 19, 19–20 (1968).
30. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 19–20 (2d Cir. 1978) (overviewing private
lines versus toll lines).
31. PSTN stands for the publicly switched telephone network.
32. See Strassburg, supra note 1, at 996–97.
33. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–231 (2012); see JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER,
DIGITAL CROSSROADS 17 (2d ed. 2013) (“Congress designed Title II of the Act to govern
wireline ‘common carriers’—that is, to the companies that provided telephone service
indiscriminately to the public at large.”).
34. BROCK, supra note 2, at 139; Paul J. Berman, Computer or Communications?
Allocation of Functions and the Role of the Federal Communications Commission, 27 FED.
COMM. L.J. 161, 167 (1974) (noting that “computer services were easily excluded from FCC
regulatory jurisdiction”); Manley R. Irwin, Computers and Communications: Public Policy at
the Crossroads, 1 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 35, 35 (1970) (noting that, originally,
“computer and communications services operated in separate, distinct worlds”).
35. Strassburg, supra note 1, at 991–92.
36. Computer I NOI, supra note 1.
37. Donald A. Dunn, Policy Issues Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communications Services, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 369, 371 (1969).
38. Id. at 369–70. Dunn’s article is an “abstract” of the longer set of reports he helped
organize as a member of the SRI. Id. at 369.
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The final Computer I orders focused most heavily on the potential entry of
common carriers into the unregulated data services market.39 One of the authors of
the SRI reports claimed this issue was “[e]asily the most controversial.”40 The fear
was that common carriers would possess unfair advantages in the new data markets.41
The FCC’s focus on common carrier entry, however, can be deceptive. Computer
I largely ignored the first question about the costs and adequacy of the carriers’
networks and services.42 These issues, however, were equally important (if not more
important) at the time. As the 1969 SRI summaries illustrate, commenters felt that
existing networks stifled data services—and not necessarily because of
discrimination. The comments consistently critiqued carriers’ sluggish technologies
and restrictive tariffs (that is, terms of service).43 They focused on costs, transmission
speeds, bandwidth offerings, error rates, and restrictions on line sharing and
equipment attachments. Today’s literature on Computer I, however, has little to say
about these important discussions.
The reason is that the FCC decided to address these issues in other proceedings.
In its 1970 Computer I Tentative Decision, the FCC acknowledged “the adequacy of
present tariff offerings of common carriers, and particularly the question of
interconnection, was the subject of considerable comment.”44 It explained, though,
that it would address these practices “through rate, tariff and licensing proceedings
that are now pending or that may be initiated in the future.”45 In this respect, the
original comments to Computer I reflected a much more diverse set of concerns than
the final Computer I orders themselves. One explanation, then, for why the modern
literature overlooks these issues is because the FCC addressed them in different
proceedings—namely, in the pre-Internet proceedings discussed in the next Part.
Having excluded these questions, the FCC’s final Computer I order in 1971
adopted three important measures. First, it distinguished “communications” services
from “data” services. Communications services would remain subject to Title II
common carrier regulation. Data services would remain unregulated, though the FCC
claimed to have authority to regulate them in the future if necessary.46 In other words,
telephone networks remained regulated, while the computer services that used them
would remain unregulated.
Second, the FCC created a third “hybrid” category for services that included
elements of both “communications” and “data.” The proper regulatory classification

39. In general, both decisions devote the most time to addressing the concerns of common
carriers entering data markets. See Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 268–69;
Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 20, at 298–304.
40. Dunn, supra note 37, at 383.
41. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 269–70; Computer I Tentative Decision,
supra note 20, at 299.
42. Dunn, supra note 37, at 371–76 (“Perhaps the most critical issue presented by the
computer inquiry is whether or not the telephone carriers are going to be capable of meeting
the rapidly growing demand for low-cost data communications.”).
43. See generally COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25.
44. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 20, at 292.
45. Id. at 294; see also Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 283–84.
46. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 268; Computer I Tentative Decision,
supra note 20, at 297–98.
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for hybrid services depended on whether the service’s “primary” use was data or
communications.47 Hybrid services would therefore require individualized,
case-by-case analysis.48 If the service was primarily communications, it would be
regulated. If it was primarily data, it would not be.
Third, the FCC decided (controversially) that common carriers could enter the
unregulated data services market. As a safeguard, it required certain carriers to create
a distinct “data” subsidiary that used entirely different equipment, revenues, and even
directors and officers. This rule became known as “maximum separation.”49 Its
rationale was to prevent discrimination and especially cross-subsidization. Potential
data competitors feared that carriers could charge artificially low prices in the data
market by shifting costs to their regulated monopoly services, which could then be
recovered from captive ratepayers.50
The maximum separation requirement, however, had important limits. For one, the
rules applied only to carriers with revenues over one million dollars. Many carriers
were thus exempted from the requirements altogether.51 Even this requirement,
however, had little practical effect on the world’s largest carrier—AT&T and the Bell
System. Since 1956, AT&T operated under a Department of Justice consent decree,
which prohibited the company from providing anything other than communications
services.52 In short, AT&T was already prohibited from entering data markets. The
Justice Department’s restriction was critical for the early data market given that the
Bell System had a nationwide presence and was—by orders of magnitude—the
largest carrier in the country.53
2. Computer II (1976–1981)
Computer technology evolved in the 1970s, and Computer I’s regulatory
definitions quickly became anachronistic. With the invention of the microprocessor
in 1971, computers got smaller, smarter, and cheaper.54 As a result, computing power
became more decentralized and distributed. Computer I’s definitions, however,
assumed a world of centralized computing processing distinct from the
communications lines that linked to it. Modern computer terminals could now

47. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 277–81; Computer I Tentative Decision,
supra note 20, at 304–06.
48. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 276 (“[W]e are prepared to render ad
hoc evaluations with respect to ‘hybrid services.’”).
49. Id. at 269–71; Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 20, at 302–04.
50. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 20, at 299; Cannon, supra note 3, at 178–81
(“[S]trict safeguards were put into place in order to restrain the market power of the
communications company and for the benefit of the data processing market.”).
51. See Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 274–75; Computer I Tentative
Decision, supra note 20, at 302–03.
52. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956), 1956
WL 99775 [hereinafter 1956 Consent Decree]; BROCK, supra note 2, at 116–20.
53. See Strassburg, supra note 1, at 993.
54. See BROCK, supra note 2, at 140; Cannon, supra note 3, at 181–82; Comment,
Interdependence of Communications and Data Processing: An Alternative Proposal for the
Second Computer Inquiry, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 307, 313–14 (1978).
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perform both communications and data functions, which put pressure on Computer
I’s mutually exclusive regulatory definitions.55 Carriers also adopted new computer
technologies to improve their own communications services, and wanted assurance
that these new practices would not violate current regulations. Accordingly, in 1976,
the FCC initiated a new proceeding that became known as Computer II.56
The FCC’s ultimate Computer II decision evolved considerably through time.
Initially, it proposed replacing Computer I’s definitions with three new categories:
basic voice, basic non-voice, and enhanced non-voice.57 As for terminal equipment
(known as customer premises equipment or CPE), the FCC proposed regulating
equipment that performed “basic media conversion” functions.58 If these definitions
seem difficult to understand, contemporary observers thought so too. The FCC later
sheepishly acknowledged that “[w]ithout exception, every element of the definitional
structure . . . was subject to criticism by one party or another” and was “uniformly
criticized.”59
The FCC tried to simplify matters in its final Computer II order in 1980. For
purposes here, the order had three important parts. First, it adopted a more simplified
set of definitions. It redefined network services as either “basic” or “enhanced.”
Basic services would be regulated, while enhanced services would not. Basic
services provided pure transmission of information, and included traditional voice
service. Enhanced services were, in practice, everything else. They included “any
offering . . . which is more than a basic transmission service.”60 The FCC deregulated
all enhanced services, but noted that they remained subject to its residual Title I61
ancillary jurisdiction.62 In short, the FCC deregulated the cars, but continued
regulating the roads.
Second, the FCC allowed common carriers—over objections—to provide
deregulated enhanced services. It took several steps, however, to prevent unfair
competitive advantages. First, the FCC required the nation’s two largest carriers
(AT&T and GTE) to sell enhanced services through a fully separate “resale” entity.
For similar reasons, the FCC required all facility-owning carriers to isolate (or
“unbundle”) their basic service and offer it on a nondiscriminatory tariffed basis to
“all enhanced service providers under the same terms and conditions.”63 Most data
services providers were not carriers, and thus needed nondiscriminatory access to the
physical telephone infrastructure.64 In short, carriers could enter the new markets, but
were subject to restrictions.

55. Computer II Supp. Notice, supra note 21, at 772–73 (“The original Computer Inquiry
did not address the question of data processing elements being removed from the central
computer and distributed . . . .”).
56. Computer II Notice, 61 F.C.C.2d 103 (1976).
57. Computer II Tentative Decision, 72 F.C.C.2d 358, 390–91 (1979).
58. Id. at 391, 412.
59. Computer II Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 410, 424–25 (1980).
60. Id. at 417–21.
61. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–162 (2012).
62. Computer II Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 435 (1980).
63. Id. at 474.
64. See id. at 466–75.
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Third, the FCC fully deregulated CPE.65 Carriers could no longer provide
equipment through tariffs. By removing CPE from carriers’ list of regulated services,
carriers could not cross-subsidize it with local monopoly revenues. The FCC also
required AT&T and GTE to sell CPE through the separate resale entity described
above.66 On reconsideration, the FCC ultimately waived the separate entity
requirements for GTE, leaving them applicable only to AT&T.67 At first glance,
Computer II seems to impose strong restrictions on AT&T. However, as argued more
fully in Part III, the real goal of Computer II was to reduce regulation to help AT&T
expand into new data and equipment markets.68
B. The Legacy of Computer Inquiries
When the FCC released Computer II, FCC Commissioner Tyrone Brown claimed
the decision “is probably the most important the [FCC] will issue in my time here.”69
The literature on Computer Inquiries echoes these views. Specifically, it assumes
that Computer Inquiries was a landmark proceeding that helped fuel the Internet’s
rise.70 Robert Cannon characterizes it as a “necessary precursor[] to the success of
the Internet.”71 More recently, Kevin Werbach writes that the “modern PC and
Internet markets developed as a direct result of the FCC’s actions in Computer I.”72
William Friedman notes that the FCC’s “Computer Inquiries are widely recognized
as having allowed the marriage of computers with phones to flourish with one key
development being . . . the Internet Service Provider.”73

65. See id. at 438–39, 447.
66. See id. at 472–74.
67. Computer II Reconsideration Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 72–73 (1980).
68. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
69. Computer II Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 517 (1980) (separate statement of
Commissioner Brown).
70. BROCK, supra note 2, at 184 (Computer Inquiries provided “institutional foundation
for the Internet as an unregulated communications system”); Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the
Giant: How the Federal Government Created Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the Internet,
78 TEX. L. REV. 1, 45, 56 (1999) (“[P]erhaps the very existence of the Internet [is an] indirect
by-product[] of the FCC’s decision in Computer I . . . .”); Cannon, supra note 3, at 169 (“They
were a necessary precondition for the success of the Internet.”); Jonathan Weinberg, The
Internet and “Telecommunications Services,” Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges,
and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 221–22 (1999) (stating
the Computer Inquiries “approach was wildly successful in spurring innovation”); Kevin
Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1259 (2007) (“The Internet is perhaps
the most significant development that was made possible by this division [of data services and
voice telephone networks].”); Werbach, supra note 3, at 1806; Erica C. Tierney, Comment,
Brand X and the Federal Communication Commission’s Adoption of the Wireline Broadband
Internet Access Order – What Now?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 317, 321
(2007) (“The FCC’s policy decision in the Computer Inquiry proceedings . . . helped give rise
to the unregulated growth of the Internet.”).
71. Cannon, supra note 3, at 204.
72. Werbach, supra note 3, at 1806.
73. William J. Friedman, Preface, 10 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 187, 188 (2002); see
also Catherine J. K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: The
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The literature attributes Computer Inquiries’ success to its “layered” regulatory
model. Robert Cannon, whose seminal article on Computer Inquiries remains the
most comprehensive, was one of the first to articulate this view.74 The basic
principle—one that predates Cannon75—is that communications networks exist in
layers that possess distinct economic and technological aspects. For instance, the
Internet relies upon physical layer functionality for actual transmission, and upon
higher layer functionality for applications and content. In short, roads are different
than cars—and regulation should reflect this reality.
Cannon argues persuasively that Computer Inquiries was ahead of its time
because it reflected these technological and economic distinctions.76 The lower-layer
transmission services (the “roads”) were uncompetitive natural monopolies. The
FCC therefore correctly regulated physical transmission as a “basic” common carrier
service. The higher-layer data services, by contrast, possessed much different
economic characteristics. At this layer, barriers to entry are much lower because data
and equipment markets lack the combination of high fixed costs and low marginal
costs that characterize utility-type networks.77 The FCC’s nonregulation of data
services recognized these distinctions as well. In short, the FCC was correct to
regulate “the bottom” while deregulating “the top.”
The literature acknowledges that the combination of both deregulation and
regulation contributed to Computer Inquiries’ success. Some scholars, however,
emphasize the benefits of the deregulatory aspects of Computer Inquiries. One
example is Jason Oxman’s influential 1999 FCC working paper The FCC and the
Unregulation of the Internet.78 He writes that the “practical effect of the [FCC’s]
decision not to regulate data processing services has been nothing short of
explosive.”79 The decision not to regulate emerging data services is “[p]erhaps the
[FCC’s] most important contribution to the success of the Internet.”80 Jonathan
Weinberg notes that Computer II’s nonregulation of enhanced services was “wildly

Role of the Federal Trade Commission Act’s Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net
Neutrality Debate, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 653 (2009) (“These regulations stemming
from the Computer Inquiries, along with other FCC decisions, led to a proliferation of
independent ISPs . . . .”).
74. Cannon, supra note 3, at 169, 194–98; see also Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice:
Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the Digital Age, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
59, 84 (2005) (arguing that Computer II was “FCC’s first foray into layered policy-making”);
Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New Communications Public
Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587, 600–09
(2004).
75. INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE, NETWORK WORKING GRP. REQUEST FOR COMMENTS
NO, 1122, REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNET HOSTS -- COMMUNICATION LAYERS 93 (R. Braden ed.,
1989), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc1122 [https://perma.cc/5D5D-RT7Z].
76. Cannon, supra note 3, at 169, 194–98.
77. See Richard S. Whitt, Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances to Foster
Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 432–36 (2009).
78. Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 3, 11 (Office of Plans
and Policy, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Working Paper No. 31, 1999), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf [https://perma.cc/D842-9W5V].
79. Id. at 11.
80. Id. at 24.
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successful in spurring innovation and competition in the enhanced-services
market.”81
Other scholars emphasize the benefits of the regulatory side of Computer
Inquiries. One early example is Steve Bickerstaff, who argues that modern computer
services are “a result of government regulatory constraints, not a free market.”82
Computer Inquiries is part of this story in that it “established a regulatory framework
conducive to the innovative and explosive growth” of the Internet. He also credits
Computer Inquiries with keeping AT&T and the Bell system from establishing a
“nationwide computer services network.” As a result, Internet services—and perhaps
the Internet itself—“are indirect by-products of the FCC’s decision in Computer I.”83
Kevin Werbach strikes a similar tone, writing that “[t]he celebrated success story of
Internet ‘unregulation’ is therefore really about effective regulation.”84
A related theme in the literature is the relationship between Computer Inquiries
and AT&T. Some claim that the FCC’s desire to limit AT&T motivated the
Computer Inquiries decisions.85 For instance, former Commissioner Glen Robinson
describes the proceedings as a “bold and innovative attempt” to address the problem
of AT&T’s monopoly.86 Other authors note that the FCC’s mutually exclusive
definitions of “data” and “communications” effectively quarantined AT&T from
entering the data market under the 1956 consent decree.87
The literature views Computer II’s unbundling and structural separation
requirements as especially important limits on AT&T and other incumbent carriers.88
These measures ensured that enhanced service providers would obtain
nondiscriminatory access to the underlying physical network.89 Susan Crawford

81. Weinberg, supra note 70, at 222; see also Tierney, supra note 70, at 321(“The FCC’s
policy decision in the Computer Inquiry proceedings . . . helped give rise to the unregulated
growth of the Internet.”).
82. Bickerstaff, supra note 70, at 61.
83. Id. at 45, 55–56.
84. Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer Commission, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1, 14 (2005);
see also Cannon, supra note 3, at 180 (noting that Computer I was “not a history of regulatory
restraint”); Sandoval, supra note 73, at 653.
85. PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 1091 (2d ed. 1999) (“Computer II was mainly concerned with
shutting AT&T out of information service markets.”); Bickerstaff, supra note 70, at 33 (“The
FCC’s elaborate scheme of definition and regulation in Computer II was designed to contain
the Bell System.”); Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871,
893–94 (2009).
86. Glen O. Robinson, The New Video Competition: Dances with Regulators, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 1016, 1036 (1997).
87. Cannon, supra note 3, at 179; Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical
Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation
in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 129 (2003) (stating that the Computer I
“decision not to regulate data processing amounted to a quarantine, excluding the platform
monopolist AT&T from the data processing (applications) sector”); Werbach, supra note 3, at
1804–05.
88. BROCK, supra note 2, at 214.
89. Werbach, supra note 84, at 24. Werbach noted later that the structural separation
proved “problematic.” Id.

1322

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:1309

writes that unbundling was the “essential move in Computer II” by requiring carriers
to sell “their basic transport services separately and without discrimination.”90 This
separation “was maintained in order to protect new computerized businesses.”91
James Speta characterizes Computer II’s unbundling requirements as a type of
successful interconnection regime.92 Unbundling also benefited the CPE market.
Joseph Farrell and Philip Weiser write that Computer II’s “open access rules, which
facilitated competition in customer premises equipment, were the most successful
and enduring.”93
The common assumption throughout this diverse literature is that the FCC’s
decisions were important. In particular, the literature assumes that Computer
Inquiries was a key source of growth for the data services and networks that
ultimately evolved into the modern Internet. The remainder of the Article challenges
this assumption. My specific point of departure is that other proceedings—the
pre-Internet proceedings—are far more responsible for these successes than
Computer Inquiries.
II. BUILDING THE PRE-INTERNET: TARIFF BATTLES IN THE 1960S AND 1970S
This section explains how the FCC helped build the “pre-Internet.” In the 1960s
and 1970s, the FCC initiated a series of tariff proceedings and rulemakings that
forced changes to carriers’ services and eliminated restrictions that stifled data
services. In doing so, these proceedings—which today’s literature often
overlooks—provided a key foundation for data networks’ growth and innovation.
This section also makes the novel observation that Computer Inquiries played an
important role in influencing the pre-Internet proceedings—not because of its
regulatory definitions—but as a source of information.
A. Carrier Networks as Obstacles for Data Services
In the 1960s, data providers and customers argued that telephone networks posed
obstacles to new data services. Some critiques raised fears of outright blocking.94
Those critiques, however, were less common than concerns about the costs and
adequacy of the traditional network for new data services. Though today’s literature
often overlooks them, these latter critiques featured prominently in the original
comments filed in Computer I and the contemporary literature.95

90. Crawford, supra note 85, at 893.
91. Id. at 894.
92. James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 225, 265–66 (2002).
93. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 87, at 130.
94. For instance, the dispute between Bunker-Ramo and Western Union is an example of
the “modern” concern of blocking competitive services outright. Kevin Werbach notes that
this “incident, now forgotten, anticipated the network neutrality fight by forty years.”
Werbach, supra note 3, at 1801.
95. For Computer I comments, see, e.g., Response of Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n,
Computer I, No. 16979 (F.C.C. Dec. 13, 1966) (“[W]e have experienced . . . unwarranted
restrictions and outmoded regulations on the availability and use of communications channels.

2016]

THE FCC AND THE “PRE-INTERNET”

1323

At the time Computer I began, communications services cost too much.96 As
noted earlier, data services required private lines to connect customers to computers.
Because they faced little to no competition, AT&T and other carriers artificially
overpriced these private lines to subsidize cheap local service. Manley Irwin,
arguably the first legal scholar to recognize these issues, wrote in 1967 that
“communication costs are becoming a greater proportion of total operating cost” for
data services.97 Bunker-Ramo (which provided electronic display equipment and
services) wrote that “smaller users cannot now afford the huge economic burden of
leasing their own private lines.”98 These costs, it added, were “an inhibiting factor to
the widespread use of computer services.”99
High costs also impacted data services that relied on publicly switched lines
(dial-up services). One particular problem was carriers’ usage-based pricing
structures, which imposed unnecessary costs on data providers. For instance, in the
mid-1960s, carriers used time-based pricing—the longer the call, the more you paid.
These charges, however, had a three-minute minimum charge even if you only spoke
for one minute or even one second.100 Such minimum charges were inappropriate for
“bursty” data transmissions that might require only a few seconds (e.g., retrieving
stock information; retrieving a case from a legal research service).101
Private-line owners faced similar problems with overbroad pricing structures.
Unlike users of the public network, private-line owners were charged flat rates for
full time twenty-four-hour use of the network. Many data customers, however, did

. . . It would be unfortunate if computer innovation were frustrated by unreasonable restrictions
. . . .”); Comments of the Government Services Administration (GSA) and the Army, in
COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25. For contemporary literature, see U.S. PRESIDENT’S TASK
FORCE ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: FINAL REPORT 21 (1968) (arguing that “removal of tariff
restrictions” would not harm the network); Irwin, supra note 24, at 361 (noting that tariffs are
facing “questioning and reappraisal”). The literature often overlooks these complaints. For a
notable exception, see Bickerstaff, supra note 70, at 19–21 (listing obstacles faced by new
data services).
96. See Dunn, supra note 37, at 371–76; Bernard Strassburg, The Marriage of Computers
and Communications—Some Regulatory Implications, 9 JURIMETRICS J. 12, 17 (1968) (stating
that costs are “of vital relevance to the economics of the data processing industry”); see also
Computer I NOI, supra note 20, at 16 (“[F]ears are expressed that the cost of communications
may prove to be the limiting factor in the future growth of the industry.”).
97. Manley R. Irwin, The Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation?, 76 YALE L.J.
1299, 1314 (1967).
98. Comments of Bunker-Ramo Corp., Computer I, No. 16979, quoted in Motion for
Official Notice of Expressions of Need for MCI’s New Concept of Microwave Serv.
Contained in Pub. Responses to the Comm’n’s Notice of Inquiry in [Computer I] at 8,
Applications of Microwave Commc’ns, Inc. for Constr. Permits To Establish New Facilities
in the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv. at Chi., Ill., St. Louis, Mo., and
Intermediate Points, No. 16509 (F.C.C. May 15, 1968).
99. Id.
100. Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 226.
101. Some of the parties who specifically critiqued the minimum time pricing in Computer
I included Bunker-Ramo, the Business Equipment Manufacturers Association (BEMA),
Electronic Industries Association, Univac, Xerox, and Collins Radio. Computer I Digests,
supra note 25.
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not use their leased channels all day.102 Some needed access for a few hours a day
when markets were open, while others wanted to access computers at night for tasks
such as payroll processing.
A separate critique focused on the carriers’ services themselves. The carriers’
bandwidth offerings (i.e., the capacity available for data transfers) were often
incompatible with data services’ needs.103 In terms of bandwidth, data customers
confronted a feast-or-famine dilemma when leasing private lines. The most basic
channel was appropriate for low-capacity voice calls, but lacked sufficient capacity
for many data uses. The next highest bandwidth offering, however, was much larger
(and thus more expensive) than necessary.104 Data services therefore needed
intermediate bandwidth channels to avoid needless costs.
These limited bandwidth offerings also impaired the equipment market.
Manufacturers intentionally made certain devices less efficient in order to be
compatible with low-speed voice lines.105 For instance, the equipment manufacturer
Rixon stated, “We feel that . . . channels with bandwidths approximating two or three
present day voice channels should be made available for data use.”106
The technology of the telephone network itself also posed challenges to data
services.107 Indeed, commenters frequently criticized carriers’ networks for not
keeping pace technologically with the demands of new data services.108 Carriers had
designed the telephone system to transport analog voices.109 It was therefore not
engineered to prevent errors in the transmission of digital information.110 Indeed,
parties frequently complained about error rates and channel reliability in the
Computer I proceedings.111 Collectively, these high costs and inadequacies
threatened future growth.
B. Tariff Restrictions as Obstacles to Data Services
The restrictions that carriers imposed on users were an even greater frustration.
Through its tariffs, the carriers prohibited practices that could have reduced, if not

102. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 20–21 (2d Cir. 1978).
103. Some of the parties criticizing bandwidth offerings included BEMA, Central
Information Processing Corporation, IBM, UNIVAC, University Computing Company,
Rixon, American Petroleum Institute, Lockheed, National Retail Merchant Association, and
GSA and the Army. COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25.
104. Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 217–19. The authors note that the speeds
went from 2000 bits per second immediately to 50,000 bits per second in the next available
offering. Id.
105. Id. at 222.
106. Comments of Rixon, in COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25.
107. Dunn, supra note 37, at 374.
108. Herbert Nolan, Moving Business Data Is Big Business, 1 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS &
L. 2, 3–4 (1970); Strassburg, supra note 29, at 21 (“[C]ommunications common carriers must
keep pace with the burgeoning computer industry . . . .”).
109. Robert P. Bigelow, Some Legal and Regulatory Problems of Multiple Access
Computer Networks, 11 JURIMETRICS J. 47, 55 (1970); Nolan, supra note 108, at 3–7.
110. Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 224–25.
111. Some examples include the comments of the National Association of Manufacturers,
UNIVAC, and GSA and the Army. COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25.
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eliminated, many of the problems described above.112 Tariffs were essentially the
telephone company’s contract with the public. Before offering any regulated service,
carriers had to file a tariff with regulators that listed its services and prices.113 The
tariffs, however, imposed various restrictions, such as the prohibition of using a
residential line for business purposes. The FCC had broad authority under the
Communications Act to reject tariff offerings that were not just and reasonable or
were discriminatory.114 Commenting parties urged the FCC to exercise this authority
to prohibit these restrictions.115 Specifically, parties criticized carriers’ limits on: (1)
foreign attachments, (2) interconnection, (3) line sharing, and (4) resale.
1. Foreign Attachments (CPE)
Today, we just assume we can plug any type of telephone into the wall without
permission. That freedom, however, did not exist in the mid-1960s. Carriers
prevented customers from attaching their own equipment to the telephone network
unless they used carrier-provided interface equipment.116 Similarly to a modern cable
company, this tariff restriction required users to lease a modem from the carrier to
connect computers and other data equipment.117 These equipment restrictions applied
only to the public telephone network. Carriers generally allowed private-line users
to attach their own equipment—a practice that contradicted the carriers’ professed
concerns that customer equipment threatened the larger network.118
These equipment restrictions stifled data services in several respects. First, carrier
modems were more expensive than comparable third-party modems.119 Even worse,
they did not work as well. Unlike independent modems, carrier modems were
standardized general-purpose devices that could not support more specialized uses.
As a result, these modems imposed artificial limits on the transmission capacities
available to users.120 The tariff restrictions also distorted equipment markets by
preventing customers from choosing the devices most suited to their needs. In doing
so, they stifled innovation and diversification, particularly for lower-cost models that
could be used on the public telephone network.

112. Comments of Dep’t of Justice at 17–19, Computer I, No. 16979 (F.C.C. March 5,
1968) [hereinafter DOJ Computer I Comments] (urging FCC to “reconsider [restrictions’]
appropriateness in the face of the inhibitions they impose on the cost, efficiency, and diversity
of computer-based systems”); Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 35.
113. Daniel A. Lyons, Tethering the Administrative State: The Case Against Chevron
Deference for FCC Jurisdictional Claims, 36 J. CORP. L. 823, 827 (2011). Tariffed services
were offered to the public at large on a nondiscriminatory basis.
114. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The FCC’s regulation
extended only to interstate service, not intrastate.
115. See generally COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25.
116. Manley R. Irwin, Vertical Integration and the Communications Industry: Separation
of Western Electric and AT&T?, 3 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 125, 134 (1969).
117. Strassburg, supra note 1, at 996–97.
118. Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 35.
119. Id. at 124–27; Irwin, supra note 116, at 136–37.
120. Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 35–36, 124–27; DOJ Computer I Comments,
supra note 112, at 21–24. The Department of Justice was more concerned by the bad quality
of the public network modems than their costs. Id.
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The comments in Computer I reflected widespread dissatisfaction with these
restrictions.121 The Business Equipment Manufacturers Association (BEMA)
asserted that carrier modems increased cost and discouraged product innovation.122
Federal parties, including the Army and the General Services Administration (GSA),
called for greater flexibility in equipment choices.123 Various other business users,
such as Eastern Airlines and the National Association of Manufacturers, urged the
FCC to eliminate the prohibition on foreign attachments altogether.124
2. Interconnection
Tariffs also imposed restrictions on interconnection. These restrictions were
closely related to the foreign attachment restrictions—and the term “interconnection”
was often used for both. Technically, however, this restriction prevented users from
connecting their own private communications networks (e.g., private microwave
systems) with the telephone network.125 Unlike foreign attachment prohibitions,
interconnection restrictions applied to both private lines and the public network.126
The practical importance was that interconnection could potentially lower costs by
reducing the need for leased private lines. Today, it would be somewhat similar to
preventing a company from attaching its private intranet service to the public
Internet.
Interconnection restrictions also inhibited competition in the carrier market. New
specialized carriers sought to provide advanced transmission services that were more
tailored to businesses’ specific demands. To do so, however, the companies needed
to interconnect with local access networks (which were prohibitively expensive to
build).127 For instance, carriers such as MCI focused on constructing higher-volume
intercity lines, but still needed AT&T’s local facilities as the final link to
customers.128 In other words, specialized carriers were building new interstate
highways but still needed to connect to other people’s driveways to reach the house.
Interconnection restrictions prevented them from doing so.
Commenters in Computer I widely criticized these restrictions. The Department
of Justice explicitly accused AT&T of using interconnection restrictions to prevent
new competitive carriers from entering the market. It wrote that “interconnection
restrictions affect computer-based services [by preventing] the emergence of
specialized carriers, such as MCI, which would provide data processors with
low-cost channels [and] specialized services.”129 MCI, unsurprisingly, also called for
interconnection rights.130 The Data Communications Association argued that the

121. Irwin, supra note 116, at 136–37 (“[C]omputer suppliers and users are unanimous in
seeking a relaxation of the prohibitions against customer-owned terminal devices.”).
122. Comments of BEMA, in COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25.
123. Comments of GSA and Army, in COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25.
124. COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25.
125. Irwin, supra note 116, at 130–31.
126. Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 155.
127. BROCK, supra note 2, at 192–93.
128. Bigelow, supra note 109, at 56–57.
129. DOJ Computer I Comments, supra note 112, at 33–34.
130. Comments of MCI, in COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25, at 108.
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“nature and extent of interconnection of data transmission equipment” would have a
“substantial impact” on the other Computer I issues.131 Other equipment
manufacturers such as Xerox raised similar objections.132 Indeed, the FCC itself
noted that interconnection was one of the most commonly raised criticisms in the
comments.133
3. Line Sharing and Resale
A third restriction prevented users from sharing leased private lines. As explained
above, private lines offered twenty-four-hour “always on” connections between two
fixed points.134 These lines, however, often went underutilized both in terms of time
and bandwidth.135 If parties could share a line (e.g., two banks could share a line that
connected to a computer in a different city), it would not only lower costs, but would
also reduce wasted capacity as well. In short, sharing would make data services
cheaper and more efficient.
Sharing could potentially work in two ways.136 First, users could collectively
purchase a line and use it at the same time. Under this arrangement, the parties could
use specialized equipment (such as multiplexers) to subdivide high-capacity lines
into multiple independent subchannels. In this respect, equipment restrictions limited
potential line sharing arrangements as well. Alternatively, customers could “time
share”—or purchase a single line and use it at different times. For instance, one party
might use the line to access computer processing during normal business hours, while
another might use it overnight while its employees were not working.
Resale services were closely related to line sharing. A resale provider might lease
a high-capacity private line and then subdivide the various channels to sell to third
parties.137 In short, they could buy a wide road and create multiple lanes for different
types of traffic. Under existing tariffs, however, these companies would be illegally
“reselling” their transmission services to third parties. Carriers also enforced resale
restrictions through “authorized user” provisions, which essentially limited the
number of parties who could use the private line.138
Line sharing and resale restrictions stunted the emerging data services industry.
The Department of Justice alleged that these restrictions limited the growth of remote
access services that customers could share.139 Interestingly, contemporary observers

131. Comments of Data Communications Association at 1–2, Computer I, No. 16979,
(F.C.C. June 12, 1970).
132. Comments of Xerox, in COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25.
133. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 20, at 292. The FCC’s use of the term
apparently included equipment attachments as well.
134. U.S. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: FINAL REPORT, supra
note 95, at 34–35.
135. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 20–21 (2d Cir. 1978).
136. DOJ Computer I Comments, supra note 112, at 39–42 (describing two categories of
line-sharing practices); Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 181–212 (same).
137. Comment, Resale and Sharing of Private Line Communications Services: A.T.&T.
Restriction and FCC Regulation, 61 VA. L. REv. 679, 679–80 (1975).
138. Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 178–79.
139. DOJ Computer I Comments, supra note 112, at 43–44 (noting that lack of sharing
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cited the ARPANet (The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network)—the first
direct ancestor of the modern Internet—to illustrate the types of remote access
service that line sharing and resale could potentially enable.140
Resale restrictions also limited innovation. With the freedom to share and resell,
new innovative carriers could emerge that offered integrated bundles of data and
communications services.141 For instance, a new company might purchase
transmission from AT&T and combine it with a specialized data service. To the user,
the transmission and data service would merge into one indistinguishable service.
Such services would not only be cheaper, but companies could tailor them to the
individual technological and business needs of customers.142
Given the growing costs of transmission service, commenters in Computer I
consistently critiqued the carriers’ restrictions on line sharing and resale. Indeed,
virtually every noncarrier party who objected to tariff restrictions complained about
the resale and line-sharing provisions.143 Several parties also sought permission to
use multiplexing equipment to enable sharing to bring down costs.144
In sum, in the mid-1960s, carriers’ networks posed significant obstacles to the
growth of data services—particularly remote access services. The network was
technologically inadequate and too expensive. Carriers exacerbated these problems
by preventing users from taking steps to lower costs and improve the technology. By
the late 1970s, however, the telephone networks had opened themselves to growth.
Indeed, many parties would later acknowledge that carriers had removed most of
these unfavorable conditions and that the data industry was thriving. These
improvements resulted not from Computer Inquiries, but from the pre-Internet
proceedings described below.
C. Tariff Reforms and the Growth of Data Services
In the 1960s and 1970s, the FCC opened a series of proceedings that laid the
foundation for the explosive growth of computer networks. Rather than listing them
chronologically, this section groups them thematically into proceedings that (1)
liberalized entry for specialized common carriers, (2) authorized equipment
attachment and interconnection, and (3) created line sharing and resale rights. In all
of these proceedings, Computer Inquiries played an important role as a source of

confines data services to local areas).
140. Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 184–85.
141. Resale and Sharing of Private Line Communications Services: A.T. &T. Restriction
and FCC Regulation, supra note 137, at 709; Note, The FCC Computer Inquiry: Interfaces of
Competitive and Regulated Markets, 71 MICH. L. REV. 172, 185–87 (1972) (stating that resale
restrictions are “the primary device by which unregulated competition is prevented”).
142. Id.
143. See generally COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25. Some examples of parties
specifically objecting to these restrictions include Bunker-Ramo Corporation, BEMA,
Electronic Industries Association, UNIVAC, Xerox, Aetna, American Petroleum Institute,
Association of American Railroads, and Lockheed Martin. Id.
144. These parties included Control Data Corporation and the Department of Justice.
COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25.
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information that influenced the FCC and the carriers. The literature, however, has
largely overlooked this informational aspect of Computer Inquiries.145
In fact, Computer Inquiries influenced tariff reform even prior to these
proceedings. The mere act of opening Computer I in 1966 created immediate
pressure for reforms by publicizing dissatisfaction with carrier networks.146 IBM
noted in 1970 that “since this inquiry began, communications-served data processing
has benefited from actions by the [FCC] and the carriers leading to liberalization of
tariff restrictions[.]”147 AT&T, for instance, reduced its minimum time charge from
three minutes to one minute.148 Carriers also began allowing increased sharing on
both voice-grade and high-capacity lines.149 More concrete reforms, however, would
soon follow.
1. Entry—The Rise of MCI
For much of the twentieth century, the FCC sanctioned the Bell monopoly to
preserve cheap local phone service. The Bell System offered local service at
below-cost rates and compensated by overcharging for private and long-distance
lines.150 It also engaged in “rate averaging,” which means that Bell averaged the costs
of serving high-cost areas and lower-cost areas denser areas. Accordingly, telephone
rates were artificially high in urban areas and artificially low in rural areas.151
Beginning in the late 1950s, microwave technology slashed the costs of
constructing transmission networks. Private microwave networks thus became an
attractive substitute for overpriced private lines.152 Microwave systems, however,
used wireless frequencies, and the FCC required permission to install them. Over
AT&T’s strong objections, the FCC approved these private systems in 1959.153 That
landmark decision—known as the Above 890 decision—changed the game. Almost
overnight, AT&T responded by overhauling its private-line services. Specifically, it
lowered the costs and allowed more sharing—at least for larger customers with the

145. But see Oxman, supra note 78, at 8 (noting the effect of “mere opening of the
Computer Inquiry”).
146. Computer I 1969 Further Notice, supra note 21, at 592–93.
147. Comments of IBM at 2, Computer I, No. 16979 (F.C.C. June 15, 1970); see also
Comments of the Bell Sys. Corp. at 2, Computer I, No. 16979 (F.C.C. June 15, 1970) (“[T]he
Bell System has filed greatly liberalized interconnection tariff regulations and new service
offerings.”); Comments of Bunker-Ramo Corporation at 31–33, Computer I, No. 16979
(F.C.C. June 15, 1970) (“[I]n the past two years, considerable improvement and flexibility
have characterized both technical and tariff offerings by AT&T. Much remains to be done
however.”); Comments of MCI at 2–3, Computer I, No. 16979 (F.C.C. June 15, 1970).
148. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 20, at 293.
149. Id. at 293–94.
150. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 33, at 38–39, 298–99.
151. Id.
152. BROCK, supra note 2, at 124–26; Manley R. Irwin, The Communication Industry and
the Policy of Competition, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 256, 256–57 (1964).
153. Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359, 404–05 (1959)
[hereinafter Above 890 Decision].
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resources to build their own microwave networks.154 Smaller users, however,
continued to pay inflated prices.155
Above 890 was the first crack in the Bell monopoly. Data services, however, were
not yet a major concern.156 Instead, the larger importance of Above 890 is that it
illustrated the benefits of competitive entry. The threat of new microwave systems
prompted AT&T to improve its services in ways that ultimately benefited future data
services. Above 890 also rejected the carriers’ arguments that competition would
harm the overall network. AT&T argued that new private systems would deprive it
of private-line revenues along its most profitable routes. This deprivation would
ultimately result in higher overall prices—an argument the FCC rejected.157 In later
proceedings, parties used the Above 890 decision rhetorically to defeat carriers’
rate-averaging arguments.158
For data services, the rise of MCI was even more important. In 1969, the FCC
authorized MCI to provide private-line service between St. Louis and Chicago.159
AT&T and other carriers had vigorously opposed MCI’s application (originally filed
in 1963), and the proceeding dragged on unnecessarily for years before the FCC
finally approved it.160 The approval had enormous consequences. MCI was now a
full-blown competitor to mighty Bell. Everyone recognized that MCI would not stop
with a single intercity route. Indeed, the entry of MCI triggered a chain of events that
ultimately led to the breakup of AT&T.
MCI’s history is often told.161 Most tellings, however, overlook how MCI used
the needs of the emerging data industry to support its arguments. Interestingly, MCI
critiqued AT&T’s inflexible tariffs in remarkably similar language. Referring to the

154. Irwin, supra note 152, at 267 (“Following the FCC’s Above 890 decision . . . Bell
introduced additional private line offerings . . . .”); Lionel Kestenbaum, The Limits of a Regulated
Monopoly—Telephone Attachments, Interconnection and Use of Circuits, 13 ANTITRUST BULL.
979, 983 (1968) (“Common carrier ventures into microwave, and service offerings such as
Telpak, were spurred by competitive alternatives.”); Harry M. Trebing, Common Carrier
Regulation—The Silent Crisis, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 319–20 (1969).
155. Calvin Davison, Stephen L. Babcock & John D. Leshy, Computers and Federal
Regulation, 21 ADMIN. L. REV. 287, 297 (1969).
156. Some parties did, however, plan to use microwave technology for data processing.
Above 890 Decision, supra note 153, at 369–75 (listing commenters’ proposed uses for private
microwave service, including “data processing”).
157. Id. at 411–12; Irwin, supra note 152, at 261.
158. See, e.g., Application of MCI for Interstate Serv. at 2, No. 16509 (F.C.C. June 1, 1965)
[hereinafter MCI 1965 Application] (citing Above 890 for the proposition that the economic
effect on carriers is not part of the Communications Act).
159. Applications of Microwave Commc’ns, Inc. for Constr. Permits To Establish New
Facilities in the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv. at Chi., Ill., St. Louis,
Mo., & Intermediate Points, 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969) [hereinafter MCI Approval Order].
160. Irwin, supra note 34, at 44. For a view sympathetic to AT&T on these issues, see
ALAN STONE, WRONG NUMBER: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 158–62 (1989).
161. See generally PHILIP L. CANTELON, THE HISTORY OF MCI: 1968-1988, THE EARLY
YEARS (1993); STEVE COLL, THE DEAL OF A CENTURY: THE BREAK-UP OF AT&T (1986); FRED
W. HENCK & BERNARD STRASSBURG, A SLIPPERY SLOPE: THE LONG ROAD TO THE BREAKUP OF
AT&T (1988); STONE, supra note 160; PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY
IN PRICES AND POLITICS (1987).
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coming “Computer Revolution,” MCI explained that new computer customers need
“high quality interconnection channels with no restriction as to their use and at low
prices.”162 In a clear swipe at AT&T’s unpopular tariffs, MCI wrote that its
permissible uses were “limited only by man’s imagination.”163 It promised to allow
interconnection, line sharing, and more appropriate bandwidth offerings. Its filings
explained that it “has no restrictive tariffs,” and that “[w]hat a subscriber does with
the channel . . . does not affect the rate that MCI charges.”164 It also noted that
carriers’ “existing rigid offerings have voided many attempts to sell . . . data
transmission systems.”165 In short, MCI sought to be the “un-carrier.”
MCI stressed data services even more heavily as the proceeding went on. In 1968,
it filed a “motion for official notice” of the FCC’s Computer I inquiry and its
comments.166 To my knowledge, the literature has never identified this document,
but it illustrates the influence of Computer I on MCI’s ultimate approval. MCI
claimed that the “two proceedings are so interrelated that the [FCC’s] determination
of the MCI case will be materially aided by official notice of comments in the
Inquiry.” The document cited many of the complaints from Computer I as evidence
of the need for new competitive carriers. In particular, it noted the “inability of the
present-day communications network to serve the emerging computer industry.”
Data services needed a “large variety of bandwidths (currently unavailable) for
customer-directed uses . . . unhampered by restrictive tariff provisions.” It also
quoted the Department of Justice’s concern that users “who needed non-standard
bandwidth must buy the next larger size, which may be an order of magnitude greater
than his requirements.”167
MCI was not alone in citing information from Computer I. The FCC’s Common
Carrier Bureau (in supporting MCI’s Computer Inquiries notice) explained that
“[c]omputer interests almost unanimously urged substantial change in common
carriers’ tariffs relating to foreign attachments and interconnection. They also called
for shorter minimum rate periods, wider variety of bandwidth offerings, and changes
in resale provisions.”168
These arguments influenced the FCC’s ultimate decision approving MCI’s entry.
In its initial decision, the FCC examiner cited the inflexibility of AT&T’s existing
tariffs as a reason to approve new competition.169 MCI’s pledge to offer “half-time

162. MCI 1965 Application, supra note 158, at 40–44.
163. Id. at Statement of Eligibility, Exhibit G.
164. Response of MCI, MCI Approval Order, No. 16509 (F.C.C. Dec. 10, 1965); Nolan,
supra note 108, at 7–8.
165. Id. (attaching a letter dated Dec. 23 from a potential customer of private-line services).
166. Motion for Official Notice of Expressions of Need for MCI’s New Concept of
Microwave Serv. Contained in Pub. Responses to the Comm’n’s Notice of Inquiry in
[Computer I] at 1, MCI Approval Order, No. 16509 (F.C.C. May 15, 1968).
167. Id. at 2–9.
168. Common Carrier Bureau’s Supporting “Motion for Official Notice” at 2, MCI
Approval Order, No. 16509 (F.C.C. May 31, 1968); see also Oral Argument Before Full
Commission at 2901–2905, MCI Approval Order, No. 16509 (F.C.C. Apr. 30, 1968)
(Common Carrier official noting the “benefits of flexibility and control” in urging full
Commission to support MCI’s application).
169. Applications of Microwave Commc’ns, Inc. for Constr. Permits To Establish New
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use and party sharing” would be “of interest especially to computer companies.”170
The FCC’s final approval also emphasized the flexibility that MCI offered in
comparison to AT&T. It explained that “MCI imposes fewer restrictions on the
nature of subscribers’ terminal equipment and on the use of its channels.”171 This
flexibility could be used for “high speed or lower speed data transmissions.”172 Prices
were important, but “flexibility”—particularly “the sharing and the part-time
features”—were also “significant factors” the FCC should consider.173
The MCI proceeding led AT&T to reform its services in ways that would benefit
future data services. For instance, in approving MCI’s application, the FCC observed
that AT&T had recently revised its tariff to allow for “joint user arrangement[s]” on
certain private lines.174 AT&T’s new service would also “accommodate a
combination of wideband data and voice grade arrangements.”175 As in Above 890,
the threat of competitive entry led to an immediate response.
2. Entry—Specialized Common Carriers
The FCC’s approval of MCI opened the floodgates for competition. Following
the decision, the FCC received dozens of applications from new specialized common
carriers (SCCs) for nearly 2000 new microwave stations.176 Rather than dealing with
each application individually, the FCC in 1971 adopted general rules that liberalized
entry for specialized common carriers—once again over the fierce objections of
existing carriers. AT&T would no longer have the private-line market to itself. This
1971 decision—the SCC Order—is another important landmark in the growth of data
services.177 The rich variety of private-line and data services of the late 1970s and
1980s traces directly back to this decision.

Facilities in the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv. at Chi., Ill., St. Louis,
Mo., and Intermediate Points, 18 F.C.C.2d 979, 984 (1967) (initial decision of hearing
examiner).
170. Id. at 1007. The examiner also displayed frustration with AT&T’s rate-averaging
arguments, noting that the “averaging method is embodied neither in the Decalogue nor in the
Constitution.” Id. at 1008.
171. MCI Approval Order, supra note 159, at 959.
172. Id. at 959.
173. Id. at 960.
174. Id. at 961 (quoting AT&T’s letter of transmittal).
175. Id. at 962. The FCC noted that AT&T’s new services contradicted its earlier claim
that “no public need exists for the sharing provisions of the MCI proposal.” Id.
176. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1145 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1975)
(“As a result [of the MCI decision], a large number of applications were filed by others
interested in providing specialized communications services in competition with the
established carriers.”); see also Bigelow, supra note 109, at 56 (“The MCI decision has led to
a rash of applications to establish common carrier microwave service.”); Irwin, supra note 34,
at 44–45; Resale and Sharing of Private Line Communications Services: A.T. &T. Restriction
and FCC Regulation, supra note 137, at 692–94.
177. Establishment of Policies & Procedures for Consideration of Application To Provide
Specialized Common Carrier Servs., 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971) [hereinafter SCC Order] (first
report and order). Philip Cantelon writes that MCI’s president “would later claim the
Specialized Common Carrier Services decision was both the industry’s Magna Carta and its
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Once again, the needs of data services drove the action. In their applications,
several parties cited the carriers’ restrictions on data services in support of liberalized
entry policies. For instance, Hallmark wrote that SCCs would focus on “undeveloped
yet badly needed communications channels [for] computer data transmission.”178
Greyhound wrote that “existing common carrier services are not adequate to meet
existing consumer needs.”179 The data equipment manufacturer Dacom complained
that customers faced “an intricate maze of restrictions and prohibitions.”180 It added
that “the rate of growth of digital transmission” has been “adversely affected by
characteristics and problems associated with the limited communications systems
and services preferred by present common carriers.”181
Interestingly, Computer I once again played a prominent informational role. The
Department of Justice wrote that the Computer Inquiry had revealed a “solid
consensus” that current rates and services were not “adequate” for computer users.182
Southern Pacific Communications, an aspiring SCC that would become Sprint, wrote
that Computer I had illustrated a “plethora” of evidence of the need for specialized
services more tailored to data users.183
The FCC also relied on Computer I to justify its final decision.184 The “computer
inquiry showed that there was dissatisfaction on the part of the computer industry
and by many data users.”185 The comments in that proceeding left “no doubt” about
the “increasing and widespread demand” for “diverse and flexible” services that were
not being “adequately met by the established carriers.”186 It added that, because of
AT&T’s size, the carrier might be unwilling to serve small niche customers with
specialized data needs.187 The FCC further concluded that competitive entry would
“motivate innovations or modifications” by all carriers.188 AT&T, for instance, had
already responded by announcing plans to build an all-digital network by 1975.189
The Department of Justice cited AT&T’s response as “striking evidence that even
the threat of new competition can generate substantial new service offerings.”190

Constitution.” CANTELON, supra note 161, at 103.
178. Letter from Hallmark, SCC Order, No. 18920 (F.C.C. Sept. 29, 1970).
179. Reply Comments of Greyhound Corp. at 3, SCC Order, No. 18920 (F.C.C. Dec. 1,
1970).
180. Comments of Data Commc’ns Ass’n at 3, SCC Order, No. 18920 (F.C.C. Sept. 30,
1970).
181. Letter from Data Commc’ns Ass’n, MCI Approval Order, No. 16509 (F.C.C. Sept.
29, 1970); see also Comments of Dep’t of Justice at 3, MCI Approval Order, No. 16509
(F.C.C. Oct. 9, 1970) [hereinafter DOJ SCC Comments] (“[T]he service offerings of the
established carriers have not been responsive to modern needs . . . particularly for transmission
of data . . . .”).
182. DOJ SCC Comments, supra note 181, at 5–6.
183. Reply Comments of S. Pac. Commc’ns at 44–45, MCI Approval Order, No. 16509
(F.C.C. Dec. 1, 1970).
184. SCC Order, supra note 177, at 875, 881–83.
185. Id. at 882.
186. Id. at 907–08.
187. See id. at 907.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 908.
190. DOJ SCC Comments, supra note 181, at 17.
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One final point is that the FCC’s SCC Order itself was not sufficient to protect
new competition. Following the order, the Bell System resisted competition by
denying interconnection with local facilities—which it argued were purely
“intrastate” and thus outside the FCC’s jurisdiction.191 In the face of the SCCs’
complaints, the FCC ultimately required Bell to provide interconnection with the new
SCCs.192
3. Foreign Attachments and Interconnection—Carterfone and Beyond
The FCC also bolstered data services by securing the right to attach equipment to
the telephone network. The story of this “right of attachment” begins with the FCC’s
Carterfone decision in 1968.193 During the late 1950s in Texas, Thomas Carter
developed a device that connected a telephone with a two-way radio.194 With the
“Carterfone,” a user could remain in contact with a telephone while working on a
ranch or oil field.195 In a sense, it was a primitive mobile phone. Attaching the
Carterfone to the telephone network, however, violated AT&T’s tariff, and the
carrier prohibited its users from connecting a Carterfone to its networks. Some
Carterfone users claimed that AT&T physically removed their telephones for these
violations.196 Carter ultimately filed an antitrust claim against AT&T, and the court
referred the case to the FCC, which ultimately ruled that AT&T’s equipment
restrictions were illegal.197 The FCC ultimately adopted regulations implementing
this decision. These rules—still known as the “Part 68” rules—require carriers to
allow any nonharmful device on their network that conforms to published
standards.198
The literature celebrates Carterfone as one of the agency’s most successful
decisions.199 The decision helped establish the principle that markets—not carriers—will
decide what equipment customers can use on the telephone network. Users could
thus purchase their own telephones, modems, and fax machines from third parties
rather than leasing them from the telephone company. For this reason, the freedom

191. Bell Sys. Tariff Offerings of Local Distribution Facilities for Use by Other Common
Carriers, 46 F.C.C.2d 413, 416 (1974) [hereinafter Tariff Offerings]; CANTELON, supra note
161, at 147.
192. Tariff Offerings, supra note 191, at 426–27.
193. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968)
[hereinafter Carterfone Decision].
194. Nicholas Johnson, Carterfone: My Story, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 677, 686 (2009).
195. Id. at 690.
196. Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 136–40.
197. Carterfone Decision, supra note 193, at 421–23.
198. 47 C.F.R. § 68 (2014); see also Kevin Werbach, Higher Standards Regulation in the
Network Age, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 206 (2009) (“Part 68, not Carterfone, marked the
true beginning of open interconnection to the public telephone network.”).
199. Philip Weiser writes that the decision has been “universally praised” in the literature.
Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 68
(2003); see also GERALD R. FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL: TECHNOLOGY
AND PUBLIC POLICY, 59–60 (1987) (citing competitive policy as an “unqualified success”).
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to attach unleashed explosive innovation and competition in the terminal equipment
market.200
Carterfone is a familiar story. The literature, however, overlooks some important
points. First, Computer I likely influenced the Carterfone decision. Indeed, some
evidence suggests that Carterfone surprised many contemporary observers. Writing
in 1969, Manley Irwin observed that Carterfone was “as startling to the computer
industry as it was disappointing to the carriers.”201 The FCC’s unanimous decision,
however, came less than a year after commenters filed their first round of Computer
I comments.202 And as explained above, parties had consistently critiqued the foreign
attachment restrictions in the stream of comments flooding into the FCC.
Second, Carterfone’s support for innovative equipment stimulated innovation and
growth in data services as well.203 Most importantly, Carterfone opened the door for
independent modems on the public telephone network. A contemporary industry
magazine observed that the FCC’s Carterfone decision “breaks the market for
modems wide open.”204 As noted earlier, carrier modems had become harmful
bottlenecks that limited the capabilities of data equipment. With better and cheaper
modems, the public could enjoy wider access to new data services.
A final point is that Carterfone alone did not establish a right of attachment.
AT&T resisted the ruling for years through its revised tariffs. For instance, AT&T
allowed foreign attachments only if the user first leased a carrier-supplied interface
device called a protective connecting arrangement, or PCA. In addition to fighting
the carriers, the FCC also struggled against hostile state regulators, who continued
enforcing attachment restrictions at the state level.205 In short, it was a slog. The FCC
engaged in several follow-up proceedings before solidifying the Carterfone
principles into the Part 68 rules.206 The FCC also successfully preempted the field to
overcome recalcitrant state regulators, with such preemption being upheld by a
federal court in 1976 and 1977.207 The larger point is that the right of attachment

200. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price
Regulation, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 135, 176 (2008); Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT’L J.
COMM. 389, 397 (2007) (crediting Carterfone for “mass consumer versions of the fax machine,
the answering machine, and, perhaps most importantly, the modem”).
201. Irwin, supra note 24, at 362.
202. The Carterfone decision was adopted on June 26, 1968. Carterfone Decision, supra note
193, at 420; see also James Pelkey, Chapter 1 Data Communications: Emergence 1956-1968
Modems and Multiplexers, ENTREPRENEURIAL CAPITALISM AND INNOVATION: A HISTORY OF
COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS 1968-1988, http://www.historyofcomputercommunications.info
/Book/1/1.10CarterfoneComputerInquiryDeregulation67-68.html [https://perma.cc/2ERM
-TH7S].
203. Irwin, supra note 34, at 48 (noting the importance of the Carterfone decision to
“suppliers of computer and peripheral transmission devices”).
204. Pelkey, supra note 202 (quoting Phil Hirsch & Angeline Pantages, FCC Carterfone
Decision Unsettles Carriers, Encourages Modem Makers, DATAMATION, Aug. 1968, at 86).
205. See Note, Competition in the Telephone Equipment Industry: Beyond Telerent, 86
YALE L.J. 538, 541–44 (1977) (detailing the efforts of several states).
206. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 85, at 668–73.
207. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977); N.C. Utils. Comm’n v.
FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976).
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resulted not merely from the FCC’s initial decision, but from years of additional
engagement and enforcement efforts.
By the late 1970s, however, the Carterfone regime was in place. Users could now
choose from a diverse variety of data equipment, and they credited Carterfone and
the Part 68 rules for improving the market.208 In 1979, the Computer and Business
Equipment Manufacturers Association (CBEMA) explained that the market for
terminal equipment “has been competitive for many years” and that the market now
“supports hundreds of companies who manufacture modems, terminals, storage
devices,” and other equipment.209 The Department of Justice noted that unregulated
third parties provided most of this new equipment.210 The FCC also observed in
Computer II that “[f]ollowing decisions by this Commission, the terminal equipment
market is characterized by an increasing amount of new and potential
competition.”211 As discussed later in the Article, this growth occurred prior to—and
independently of—the FCC’s 1980 Computer II decision that deregulated customer
premises equipment.
4. Resale and Line-Sharing Proceedings
Finally, the FCC also advanced data services by prohibiting limits on line sharing
and resale services. Its 1976 Resale Order forced carriers to remove all remaining
restrictions on these practices.212 Once again, the FCC justified its decision by
explicitly citing information from the Computer I and SCC proceedings. Both
proceedings, it explained, had “manifested the existence of a substantially untapped,
growing public need for non-voice communications.”213
Easing these restrictions benefited the data industry in several respects.214 First, it
lowered costs. Customers could now spread the costs of data services among multiple
parties. As for providers, the Resale Order opened “new markets that hundreds of
new companies have entered”215 and encouraged “an entire industry of [new]
resellers.”216 Liberalized resale encouraged new companies by dramatically lowering
barriers to entry. For instance, any resale provider could now purchase capacity on a
private line from AT&T (the “underlying carrier” who owned the facilities),217

208. Comments of McDonnell Douglas Automation Co. at 32, Computer II, No. 20828
(F.C.C. June 6, 1977); Comments of Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users at 20–22, Computer II, No.
20828 (F.C.C. May 16, 1977).
209. Comments of CBEMA at 46–48, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. Oct. 1979).
210. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 412.
211. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 21, at 437.
212. Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs. &
Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976) [hereinafter Resale Order].
213. Id. at 266–67.
214. Comments of CBEMA, Resale Order, No. 20097 (F.C.C. Dec. 11, 1974) (noting that
the FCC’s decision would affect the “nature and availability” of services “essential . . . for
computer and information processing purposes”).
215. WALTER G. BOLTER, JERRY B. DUVALL, FRED J. KELSEY & JAMES W.
MCCONNAUGHEY, THE TRANSITION TO COMPETITION: TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE
1980S, at 160 (Walter G. Bolter ed.,1984).
216. FAULHABER, supra note 199, at 71.
217. Resale Order, supra note 212, at 271 (defining “underlying carriers”).
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combine it with innovative data processing features, and resell the entire service as
one integrated offering to multiple customers. Resellers could also specifically tailor
these services to the demands of individual industries, such as airlines.218 In short,
resale promised cheaper and more innovative services.
Liberal resale and sharing also promoted private-line competition. (As noted
earlier, data services primarily used private lines to service business customers). In
the comments, for instance, SCCs such as Southern Pacific (later Sprint) argued that
resale restrictions had limited its ability to expand service.219 If the company wanted
to expand to a new city and finish the route by reselling AT&T’s facilities, AT&T
denied its requests citing tariff restrictions.220 In this respect, the Resale Order both
facilitated competition and pressured AT&T to reform its services.
The Resale Order also provided the template for the ultimate Computer II orders,
though today’s literature generally overlooks this ancestry. In particular, the Resale
Order tackled challenges that would reemerge in Computer II. For instance, the FCC
struggled with whether to regulate new resellers that offered both data and
communications services. Incumbent carriers had argued that the Communications
Act required the FCC to regulate any “communications” services.221 Incumbents thus
sought to use regulation to stifle competitive entry.
The Resale Order addressed this problem in an interesting way. It confirmed that
Title II222 governed resellers, but it waived several of the statute’s most onerous
statutory requirements.223 In particular, it liberalized entry and allowed markets to
dictate prices and service offerings.224 In effect, it deregulated resale services while
affirming its potential regulatory jurisdiction over them—a pattern the FCC would
repeat in Computer II a few years later.225
The Resale Order also anticipated Computer II’s celebrated unbundling and
structural separation regimes. The FCC worried about a subset of resellers that
owned facilities that provided monopoly voice services. These carriers could
potentially cross-subsidize competitive resale services with regulated monopoly
revenues. To address these concerns, the Resale Order required these specific
carriers226 to create a separate entity to provide competitive resale services.227 The

218. Id. at 267–68. One early example was ARINC, which stands for Aeronautical Radio,
Incorporated. Its resale service was specialized for the airline industry. The company had
received special permission to implement sharing, and other organizations wanted similar
rights. Id.
219. Comments of S. Pac. Commc’ns at 8–13, Resale Order, No. 20097 (F.C.C. Dec.
11, 1974).
220. Id. at 8–9.
221. The FCC lacked express authority to “forbear” from enforcing regulations until the
1996 Telecommunications Act. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2012).
222. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–231 (2012).
223. Resale Order, supra note 212, at 308 (confirming resale as a common carrier service).
224. Id. at 308–12.
225. This pattern of regulation with forbearance is similar in this respect to the FCC’s most
recent proposed network neutrality regime that relies on Title II and forbearance. Steve Lohr,
F.C.C. Plans Strong Hand to Regulate the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015, at B1.
226. The carriers in question were those that both owned facilities and provided monopoly
voice services.
227. Resale Order, supra note 212, at 316 (“[U]nderlying carriers which provide basic
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communications service would therefore be isolated (or unbundled) from the resale
service.228
The FCC explicitly incorporated this model into Computer II a few years later.
Specifically, it proposed both a separate entity for competitive “enhanced” services
and required carriers to “unbundle” its basic transmission service.229 Thus, any
celebrations of Computer II must recognize the contributions of the more obscure
Resale Order that forged the initial template.
In sum, the Resale Order facilitated the growth of the data industry in several
respects. By prohibiting tariff restrictions, the FCC helped to lower the costs of
communications capacity and to encourage the entry of many new competitive
providers. The order also ensured that resale carriers and SCCs in competitive
markets would not face the same Title II regulations as traditional common carriers
providing monopoly services. Finally, the FCC explicitly modeled Computer II’s
unbundling and structural separation regimes upon the Resale Order.
III. THE LIMITS OF COMPUTER INQUIRIES
The previous section establishes the importance of the pre-Internet proceedings
as a foundation of the Internet. I also, however, argued that Computer Inquiries
influenced those proceedings in ways the literature overlooks—by providing
information. This section, by contrast, argues that the more famous parts of
Computer Inquiries—its celebrated regulatory decisions—were less consequential
than the literature assumes. In many instances, Computer Inquiries merely ratified
the effects of the pre-Internet proceedings. Further, understanding Computer
Inquiries’ historical context complicates modern narratives that invoke it to justify
certain deregulatory and regulatory policies.
A. The Limits of Computer I
Despite their hype, Computer I’s decisions were narrower than they seem. Most
importantly, Computer I neglected concerns about costs, network quality, or tariff
restrictions.230 These concerns, however, were arguably the most pressing issues for
commenters when Computer I began. Indeed, virtually every noncarrier commenter
critiqued some aspect of the carriers’ network service offerings in the initial rounds

monopoly services as part of their normal business will be required to establish separate,
arms-length subsidiaries in order to engage in resale . . . .”).
228. Id.
229. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 395 (“In essence, we proposed a resale
structure for the provision of all [enhanced] services.”); Computer II Tentative Decision, supra
note 21, at 393–99 (applying the Resale Order structure to carrier offerings of data). On
reconsideration, the FCC applied the requirement only to AT&T. Computer II Reconsideration
Order, supra note 21, at 72–73. The unbundling requirement to separate basic transmission
and sell it independently, however, remained applicable to all such carriers. Computer II Final
Decision, supra note 10, at 474–75.
230. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 283–84; Computer I Tentative Decision,
supra note 20, at 294.
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of comments.231 Contemporary scholars also initially assumed the Computer Inquiry
would address tariff restrictions. For instance, in 1969, Manley Irwin wrote that
reform to the communications industry has “come about through a re-evaluation of
long-standing tariff practices.”232 The Computer Inquiry was one “crucial”233 inquiry
into such practices.234 The FCC, however, exiled these issues from the proceeding
altogether, deciding instead to address them in individual “rate, tariff and licensing
proceedings.”235
We should therefore understand Computer I as a subset of a much larger series of
proceedings that promoted competition and entry. Indeed, the literature of the late
1960s often listed the “Computer Inquiry” as merely one of several ongoing FCC
efforts to liberalize entry and to reform carrier tariffs.236 These articles therefore
discussed the Computer Inquiry in the context of other equally important proceedings
involving Carterfone, MCI, the specialized common carriers, authorized user
restrictions, and the various rate investigations of AT&T.237
The Computer I decisions themselves broke little new ground, but instead
reflected well-established practices and norms.238 The FCC (and its predecessors)
had regulated communications services since the early 1900s. Data services, by
contrast, developed independently of the phone network and had never been
regulated.239 In continuing these policies through its regulatory definitions of
“communications” and “data,” the FCC was effectively pushing on an open door.240
Further, Computer I’s alleged quarantine of AT&T merely maintained the status quo.

231. See generally COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25.
232. Irwin, supra note 116, at 136.
233. Id.
234. Kestenbaum, supra note 154, at 980–81 (listing the Department of Justice’s early
filings in Computer I seeking reform of restrictions on attachments, interconnection, and
sharing).
235. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 20, at 294; see also Computer I Final
Decision, supra note 20, at 283–84.
236. Strassburg, supra note 1, at 992 (“Apart from the record in the computer Inquiry, the
issues of competition and monopoly permeate the current deliberations . . . in a number of
other proceedings.”).
237. Davison et al., supra note 155, at 288–98; Irwin, supra note 24, at 361–63; Irwin,
supra note 116, at 136–37; Boyd Nelson, Development of the Domestic Communications
Industry: Evolution of its Structure in Consideration of Technological, Political and Economic
Influences, 28 FED. COMM. B.J. 118, 127–30 (1975) (transcript from seminar); Strassburg,
supra note 29, at 19–21 (discussing importance of rate investigations to computer growth);
Trebing, supra note 154, at 318–24.
238. BROCK, supra note 2, at 171 (noting “widespread agreement” on basic principles that
telephone services should be regulated and computer services should not be); see also
Comments of American Bankers, in COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25 (“It is assumed that
use of communications facilities and services will be regulated.”).
239. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724,
735–36 (2d Cir. 1973).
240. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; Hanan Samet, Computers and
Communications: The FCC Dilemma in Determining What to Regulate, 28 DEPAUL L. REV.
71, 85 n.70 (1978). One could argue, however, that the definitions reinforced traditional norms
of separation. See Crawford, supra note 85, at 891–92.
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The 1956 consent decree already excluded AT&T from the data services market. The
country’s largest carrier also consistently disclaimed any interest in providing data
services at the time.241
Computer I, therefore, deserves less credit for its deregulatory measures than the
literature recognizes. For one, the FCC never seriously considered regulating data
services beyond the narrow subset of pure message switching. The earliest comments
to Computer I universally rejected any notion of regulating data services, which
commenters viewed as naturally competitive.242 This wide consensus reflects the
strong norms against regulation that predated the proceeding. Indeed, Manley Irwin
observed that merely raising the question of data regulation “caught some observers
by surprise.”243 Robert Cannon also wrote that the FCC became “increasingly
apologetic” about regulating data as the proceeding went on.244
The FCC’s enforcement history further illustrates these pre-existing norms. In the
years following Computer I, the FCC rarely applied the rules at all despite the growth
in hybrid services. In fact, the FCC pursued only two cases under Computer I—both
of which involved services by regulated carriers (Western Union and AT&T).245
There is no evidence that the FCC used the Computer I rules to regulate any
noncarrier company.
In addition, the FCC’s deregulation itself was limited in scope. All parties
implicitly assumed that the underlying telephone network would remain regulated.246
The key issue in Computer I and the tariff proceedings was not whether to regulate
common carriers, but how. The primary worry was that carriers would enjoy unfair
advantages in data markets through cross-subsidization.247 My research, however,
failed to uncover a single commenter—including common carriers themselves—who
proposed deregulating the underlying physical transmission service itself.
If Computer I’s deregulatory measures are overvalued, the same is true for its
regulatory measures. As stated above, all parties assumed that Title II regulation
would continue as it had for decades. Even the more novel “maximum separation”
policy had only modest effects on the industry. The policy only applied to carriers

241. Comments of the Bell Sys. at 4, Computer I, No. 16979 (F.C.C. June 15, 1970) (“We
have made it clear . . . that our interest is to provide communications for the data processing
industry rather than to offer processing services to the public.”); Dunn, supra note 37, at 386.
242. Letter from IBM, Computer I, No. 16979 (F.C.C. Dec. 12, 1966) (“We are confident
that the [FCC] Notice of Inquiry is not intended to encompass the vast area of computer uses
that are not germane to the field of communication regulation.”).
243. Manley R. Irwin, The Computer Utility: Market Entry in Search of Public Policy, 17
J. INDUS. ECON. 239, 240 (1969).
244. Cannon, supra note 3, at 175 (noting that the FCC clarified that “it never had any
intention whatsoever at any time of regulating data processing”).
245. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 21, at 379–80; Comments of GTE Telenet
at 18, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. June 6, 1977) (noting that the FCC in six years had “not
once directed an unregulated entity submit to Title II regulation . . . despite the fact that it has
received a number of requests to do so”).
246. Irwin, supra note 243, at 248 (noting that communications circuits are “clearly . . .
subject” to regulation).
247. FAULHABER, supra note 199, at 115; Dunn, supra note 37, at 384 (“There is a deeply
felt concern in the data-processing industry that the carriers are likely to sell teleprocessing
[data] services below cost and recover the losses . . . from their monopoly business.”).
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with annual revenues over one million dollars.248 The consent decree, however,
already excluded the biggest one—AT&T.249 Gerald Faulhaber writes that, because
of the consent decree, “the separate subsidiary clause had no significance.”250
Maximum separation also ratified market decisions that several carriers had
already independently made. GTE and some independent carriers structurally
separated their communications and data services years before the Computer I
decisions.251 Western Union noted that “carriers on their own volition have moved
vigorously to separate their regulated and nonregulated businesses.”252 In this
respect, Computer I arguably reduced the scope of Title II regulation by granting
smaller carriers the freedom to integrate their services without strict separation.
For this reason perhaps, regulated carriers supported the separation requirements.
Interestingly, GTE did not initially object to the forced separation regulations even
though it would ultimately sue the FCC over them. Following the 1970 Tentative
Decision, GTE wrote that it “takes no exception” to the FCC’s decision, and that it
had “already implemented the safeguards proposed” years earlier.253 GTE only sued
after the FCC added additional restrictions in its Final Decision.254 Accordingly, my
research demonstrates that the litigation following Computer I stemmed from a
narrower dispute than the literature previously recognized.
Further, Computer I’s regulations likely stunted the growth of a narrow subset
of computer operations known as “message switching” or “store and function”
services.255 These services were, in a sense, early forms of email that threatened
regulated telegram and telex services.256 These services were also difficult to
classify for regulatory purposes as they included both data processing and
traditional communications functions. The FCC, however, largely punted on this
question, ruling that these “hybrid” services would be classified on a case-by-case
basis depending on the service’s “primary” use.257 This decision arguably harmed

248. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
249. Robert Cannon has suggested that the requirements may only have been applied to
AT&T and GTE. Cannon, supra note 3, at 179. The FCC, however, implied that the restriction
would apply more broadly. See Computer I Final Decision, supra 20, at 275 n.7.
250. FAULHABER, supra note 199, at 66.
251. Comments of GTE and GTE Data Services at 2–3, Computer I, No. 16979 (F.C.C.
June 15, 1970) (noting it had separated its data business in 1967) [hereinafter GTE 1970
Comments]; Irwin, supra note 34, at 43 (asking whether regulatory questions are “irrelevant”
and face a “fait accompli” because many carriers have “established vertical affiliates for
commercial [data] services”); Irwin, supra note 24, at 366.
252. W. Union, Request for Limited Reargument at 3, Computer I, No. 16979 (F.C.C. May
18, 1971).
253. GTE 1970 Comments, supra note 251, at 1–3.
254. These additional requirements limited carriers’ ability of data subsidiaries to market
services to its parent and to share the same corporate name. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d
724, 732–33 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that these challenges constituted the “principal attack”).
255. See Irwin, supra note 34, at 37 (“The dispute assumed a new order of magnitude when
computers were utilized to store and forward record messages . . . .”); Strassburg, supra note
1, at 995–97 (introducing regulatory challenges of message switching).
256. This dynamic is identified in Comment, Computer Services and the Federal
Regulation of Communications, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 328, 335–36 (1967).
257. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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pure computerized message switching services by potentially subjecting them to
Title II regulations and entry requirements.258 It also subjected them to
discrimination because carriers were freer to discriminate against fellow regulated
carriers.259
B. The Limits of Computer II
1. Computer II as Follower
Computer II is the more famous—and lasting—part of the Computer Inquiries
proceedings. Recall that the final order announced three key decisions.260 First, its
definitions divided the world into regulated “basic” transmission services and
deregulated “enhanced” services. Second, the FCC allowed regulated carriers to offer
enhanced services and CPE (terminal equipment) subject to unbundling and
structural separation requirements. Third, the FCC deregulated all terminal
equipment, or CPE.261
The literature celebrates these decisions as a key foundation for the growth of data
services and ultimately the Internet.262 When viewed in historical context, however,
they are less consequential than they appear. The literature inverts the causal
relationship of Computer II and the growth of data services. Computer II was largely
an effect of growth rather than a significant cause. The growth of the 1970s arose
from technological innovation and the favorable legal environment that the
pre-Internet proceedings had created. By the time the FCC adopted the final
Computer II definitions in 1980, the sheer diversity of new services and equipment
had rendered several Computer II decisions a fait accompli. In short, the pre-Internet
proceedings led, while Computer II followed.
The FCC’s deregulation of CPE illustrates this dynamic. The growth of terminal
equipment traces back to the 1968 Carterfone decision, which affirmed the freedom
to attach equipment.263 While carriers and state regulators resisted this regime for
years, the FCC had firmly established this right in the late 1970s following multiple

258. See Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 21, at 381; Letter from Raymond R.
Panko, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. May 16, 1977) (alleging that Computer I “impaired
the development of CMS (computer message services) because their applicability is highly
uncertain”); Berman, supra note 34, at 178–79 (“The Computer Rules, however, unwittingly
or not, widen the FCC’s [authority] to include a good deal that is not strictly point-to-point
communications.”); The FCC Computer Inquiry: Interfaces of Competitive and Regulated
Markets, supra note 141, at 182–84 (predicting that regulations will cause providers to “cease
offering the service”).
259. Computer Services and the Federal Regulation of Communications, supra note 256,
at 337.
260. See supra Part I.A.2.
261. See supra Part I.A.2.
262. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
263. Carterfone Decision, supra note 193, at 423–24.
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enforcement proceedings and court challenges.264 The equipment market was
therefore thriving well before the FCC decided Computer II.265
This rapid growth arguably forced the FCC’s hand in both its definition and
deregulation of CPE. Because things were moving so fast, the FCC had little choice
but to deregulate the entire field. For instance, in its 1979 Computer II Tentative
Decision, the FCC emphasized its inability to coherently divide regulated
“communications” equipment from unregulated “data processing” equipment. The
“rapidly changing” evolution of CPE would inevitably make any division “arbitrary”
and would “result in a regulatory quagmire.”266 Despite these obstacles, the FCC
initially clung to regulatory distinctions that turned on whether CPE offered “basic
media conversion” functions.267 Following a round of hostile comments, the FCC
abandoned this effort in its Computer II Final Decision a year later. It acknowledged
that its definition scheme “garnered little support” and had been “uniformly
criticized.”268 It therefore deregulated CPE altogether in light of the “rapid pace of
technological evolution.”269
The larger point is that a combination of technological innovation and a favorable
regulatory environment largely determined the outcome in Computer II. By
liberalizing tariffs, the pre-Internet proceedings accelerated technological evolution
in terminal equipment, which in turn made it impossible to craft coherent regulatory
distinctions. Further, liberalized entry gave rise to a new coalition of equipment
vendors and customers who could (and did) exert political pressure on the agency.
In this respect, the tariff proceedings created a favorable feedback effect. Easier entry
expanded the number of companies. That expanded number, in turn, lobbied for even
stronger protections for competition.270
This dynamic also drove the FCC’s treatment of “enhanced” services. Data
services had enjoyed tremendous growth in the decade prior to Computer II’s final
order.271 Much like with the CPE markets, the FCC’s pre-Internet proceedings helped
accelerate this growth by intervening to liberalize carrier tariffs and to introduce new
competition that pressured carriers to improve the telephone network. Indeed, the
proceedings’ records list several examples of AT&T responding (very quickly) to
new competitive threats by upgrading its network, providing better service offerings,
and permitting greater sharing.272 Observers in the late 1970s specifically credited

264. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text; see also Manley R. Irwin &
William H. Barrett, The Public Utility Status of the Computer Industry, 3 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS & L. 219, 226–30 (1974).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 208–11.
266. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 21, at 410–11.
267. Id. at 412.
268. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 410.
269. Id. at 436.
270. See FAULHABER, supra note 199, at 48–49.
271. Hopewell, supra note 24, at 7–8 (providing growth figures); Interdependence of
Communications and Data Processing: An Alternative Proposal for the Second Computer
Inquiry, supra note 54, at 313–14.
272. See supra Part II.C.4; see also DOJ SCC Comments, supra note 181, at 17 (citing new
AT&T tariffs as “striking evidence that even the threat of new competition can generate
substantial new service offerings”); MCI Motion for Official Notice of AT&T Tariff Changes
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the tariff proceedings for helping establish a phone network that was now adequate
for most data services’ needs.273
More broadly, the rise of specialized common carriers and resale providers
generated increased investment and competition in private-line markets. The
approval of MCI immediately triggered hundreds of new applications from
specialized carriers, many of whom aimed to tailor their services for data
customers.274 This expanded infrastructure became the bedrock of the Internet, which
ultimately combined many of these preexisting networks through the shared TCP/IP
(transmission control protocol/internet protocol) protocol.275
These developments frustrated the FCC’s efforts to craft coherent definitions.
Indeed, commenters uniformly criticized the FCC’s initial “definitional approach” as
vague and unworkable in light of rapid technological change.276 The FCC finally
settled on the now familiar definitions of basic and enhanced services. These
definitions, however, were simpler and more humble efforts.277 For instance, the FCC
defined “basic” service narrowly to include only pure transmission capacity.278
“Enhanced” services, by contrast, were everything else. The FCC defined them
negatively in terms of what they were not—namely, “any offering . . . which is more
than a basic transmission service.”279 These humble definitions reflected the futility
of the FCC’s earlier efforts to draw coherent lines. Indeed, the FCC defended its
ultimate approach by citing the “ever continuing convergence of communications
and data processing”280 and the need to “comport[] with the actual development of

at 3, MCI Approval Order, No. 16509 (F.C.C. May 15, 1968) (stating that MCI’s entry caused
AT&T to “suddenly and belatedly c[o]me forward with its own sharing proposal”).
273. Alex Curran, Am. Fed’n of Info. Processing Soc’ys, Dimension of the Need for
Computer Communications at 1, 9, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. Nov. 7, 1976) (noting that
“outspoken criticisms of data users during the late 1960s is no longer valid” and that major
users—though not necessarily smaller users—now have adequate services); Donald Dunn,
Limitations on Growth of Computer-Communications Services, Computer II, No. 20828
(F.C.C. Nov. 7, 1976) (noting that Resale Order “removed some of the most serious limits to
the growth of this industry by opening the market . . . to essentially any firm willing to operate
as a resale carrier”).
274. See text accompanying note 176.
275. BROCK, supra note 2, at 294; see also Oxman, supra note 78, at 8–9 (noting the
importance of private-line competition to data services); Werbach, supra note 70, at 1258
n.122 (citing an internet backbone expert for the proposition that “growth of private lines is
the crucial metric for the success of the internet”).
276. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 21, at 390, 393. They were particularly
concerned that the definitions would either unreasonably expand or narrow regulation. Id.
at 374 (“A great diversity of views exists as to the actual impact [of the proposed definitions]
. . . on both the regulated and unregulated sectors.”).
277. See Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 417–18 (“Unnecessary confusion
may have resulted in proposing these three service categories using voice/non-voice
terminology.”).
278. Id. at 418–19.
279. Id. at 420. The revised approach was necessary to provide a “regulatory demarcation”
that was “relatively clear-cut.” Id.
280. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 21, at 393–94.
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this dynamic industry.”281 In short, enhanced services had become too complex to
classify.
The dynamics unleashed by the pre-Internet proceedings influenced not only the
FCC’s definitions of enhanced services, but also their deregulation. Initially, the FCC
wanted to continue regulating certain enhanced services. “Enhanced,” however, was
not coextensive with the FCC’s older definition of “data.” Instead, it encompassed a
much broader category of services that easily qualified as communications
services.282 For instance, a reseller might purchase a private line from AT&T to offer
an integrated “enhanced” package of communications and data services. The
challenge was whether to regulate the “communications” component of enhanced
services under Title II.
Initially, the FCC clung to its older definitions. Its Computer II Tentative Decision
affirmed that enhanced communications services would remain regulated, and thus
subject to tariff requirements.283 In its Computer II Final Decision, however, the FCC
ultimately abandoned efforts to make these distinctions and deregulated the entire
category.284 In reaching this conclusion (against its initial preferences), the FCC
repeatedly emphasized the practical impossibility of drawing coherent lines in the
face of such explosive technological evolution. It wrote:
[W]e conclude that further attempts to . . . distinguish enhanced services
would be ultimately futile . . . . [O]ver the long run, any attempt to
distinguish enhanced services will not result in regulatory certainty. . . .
There are literally thousands of unregulated computer service vendors
offering competing services connected to the interstate
telecommunications network. The services they provide are many and
varied. The only limitation [sic] . . . are those arising from the constraints
of their own entrepreneurial capabilities and . . . the implicit requirement
that they structure their services so as to avoid crossing a regulatory
boundary that would subject them to regulation.285
Much like with CPE, the FCC’s ultimate deregulatory decisions evolved
considerably from its initial preferences. Its final definitions, however, were reactive.
They were driven both by technological growth that made distinctions impossible
and by the emergence of a new coalition of carriers, providers, and customers who
strongly opposed efforts to impose restrictions. A key foundation of these
developments, in turn, was the pre-Internet proceedings in the years before Computer
II, which had helped accelerate and expand these forces.

281. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 422.
282. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 21, at 390 (“‘[E]nhanced non-voice’
service by definition subsumes both communications and data processing services . . . .”).
283. Id. at 399, 405.
284. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 425–28.
285. Id. at 425–26.
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2. Computer II in Historical Context
Because of its perceived success, Computer II is often cited to justify modern
regulatory and deregulatory policies. The historical context described above,
however, challenges some of these uses. In particular, the modern literature often
overlooks the embedded—and often unspoken—assumptions of Computer II that
complicate traditional narratives.
a. Computer II as Deregulation
When viewed in context, Computer II provides little support for those who invoke
it to justify broad deregulation. For instance, one question in the modern network
neutrality debates is whether to isolate and reclassify one piece of broadband
access—the physical transmission layer—for Title II regulation.286 Some opponents
of this approach cite Computer II to justify their resistance. For instance, Fred
Campbell, former FCC Wireless Chief, cites Computer II in arguing against such
regulation. Computer II, he argues, illustrates both the futility of drawing coherent
categories and the dangers of creating regulatory disparity among industry players.287
These arguments, however, overlook Computer II’s embedded background
assumptions. Specifically, Computer II always assumed that extensive regulation
would continue at the physical layer. The entire edifice of Computer II rested on Title
II’s continuing regulation of a distinct and isolated basic service. Indeed, the very
term “enhanced” implies a service that builds upon a foundational platform.
Modern audiences should therefore understand that Computer II’s deregulatory
language implicitly excluded physical transmission. Donald Dunn, a main author of
the original Computer I SRI reports, stated, “[T]here is no serious argument about
the appropriateness of some sort of regulation of firms operating only at level 1 [i.e.,
the basic physical transmission layer].”288 Accordingly, Computer II’s language
about the difficulties of drawing distinctions was limited to higher-layer enhanced
services. Everyone assumed regulation of the underlying telephone network would
continue.
The key questions therefore involved whether to regulate newer companies that
incorporated “basic” transmission within a larger service. The Resale Order that
predated Computer II illustrates this dynamic. Much like “enhanced,” the term
“resale” implies a foundational regulated service that will be “resold.” When the FCC
relaxed regulation for resale carriers, it nonetheless assumed that these carriers would

286. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, 5612–16 (2014)
(providing notice of proposed rulemaking and requesting comment on reclassification
authority for network neutrality rules).
287. Comments of Time Warner Cable at 9–11, Protecting and Promoting the Open
Internet, No. 14-28 (F.C.C. July 15, 2014) (arguing against reclassification because
“telecommunications and information-processing elements are inextricably combined . . . .”);
Fred Campbell, A Primer on the Dangers of Imposing FCC Title II Regulations on the Internet,
CTR. FOR BOUNDLESS INFO. IN TECH: BLOG (May 14, 2014), http://cbit.org/blog/2014/05
/a-primer-on-the-dangers-of-imposing-fcc-title-ii-regulations-on-the-internet [https://perma.cc
/Q7BD-BWZX].
288. Dunn, supra note 273, at 12.
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build upon regulated communications services. The agency explained, “[W]e
anticipate that resale services will be provided by entities which do not provide
monopoly services . . . .”289 Instead, it assumed these newer carriers would purchase
capacity from underlying monopoly carriers.290
Computer II’s concerns about regulatory disparity were similarly confined to
enhanced services. Following the Resale Order, the FCC had created a regime that
treated resale communications carriers better than resale data providers. Resale
communications carriers could easily expand into data without triggering additional
regulatory burdens. Pure data vendors, however, would trigger Title II regulations if
they expanded into communications service.291 In Computer II, the FCC solved the
problem by sweeping all these resale services into the “enhanced” category and
deregulating the entire category to avoid regulatory disparity.292 These actions,
however, were confined to enhanced services that built upon basic service. All parties
assumed that regulatory disparity would continue between basic transmission
providers and everyone else. In short, the debate simply involved one layer.
The larger point is that contemporary parties assumed a clear division between
monopoly providers and everyone else. This assumption is reflected in both the
Resale Order and Computer II, both of which assumed the existence of a
foundational transmission service that would remain distinct and regulated. Not a
single party in either proceeding assumed that the diversity of enhanced and resale
services provided a reason to deregulate the entire network at all layers. Such a
measure would have been unthinkable to contemporary parties.
b. Computer II as Regulation
History also challenges those who invoke Computer II to justify certain types of
regulation. The literature often supports these arguments by citing the success of
Computer II’s unbundling and structural separation requirements.293 These measures,
it claims, constrained carriers and opened the network for data services and,
eventually, internet service providers. Susan Crawford has also argued that the
unbundling requirement reinforced the norm of separation of transport and data—a
norm she persuasively identifies as a key theme in American communications law
history.294
This particular unbundling requirement, however, has a more ambiguous history.
At the time of Computer II, the unbundling requirement actually loosened regulations
on many carriers. Indeed, many parties objected to Computer II on the precise ground
that it provided too much freedom to incumbent carriers.295 Prior to the Computer II

289. Resale Order, supra note 212, at 315–16.
290. Id. at 301–02.
291. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 426–27.
292. Id. at 427–28.
293. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text; see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER,
supra note 33, at 190–91.
294. Crawford, supra note 85, at 893–94 (“The key separation between ‘transport’ and
‘other’ was maintained in order to protect new computerized businesses.”).
295. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 404 (“Other parties . . . urge the FCC
to require all underlying carriers to establish separate subsidiaries . . . .”). The opposition came
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Final Decision, the FCC imposed separation requirements on incumbent carriers
providing data services (at least those with revenues over one million dollars).296 The
FCC, however, eliminated these requirements for all carriers except, ultimately,
AT&T. Instead of separating their data services in a subsidiary, carriers merely had
to unbundle them.
The unbundling requirement itself, however, provided relatively weak protection.
The primary motivation for unbundling was to prevent cross-subsidies, rather than
more modern concerns about blocking.297 The end of structural separation, however,
expanded opportunities to subsidize enhanced service offerings (paying for physical
transmission, for instance, was not the only cost).298 Further, unbundling itself would
have accomplished little without the pre-Internet proceedings. Even with
unbundling, a carrier could still limit a future internet service provider by applying
restrictions on resale, interconnection, and equipment attachment.
Another theme in the literature is that Computer II focused primarily on restricting
AT&T.299 The problem, however, is that Computer II seems designed to help AT&T
expand into new markets in several respects.
First, the FCC likely initiated Computer II in the first place to help AT&T. The
literature, however, traditionally explains that Computer II responded to problems
with the FCC’s “hybrid” category, which created an “inundat[ion]” of “applications
concerning hybrid services.”300 The contemporary comments filed in Computer II,
however, tell a different story. Contrary to current perceptions, many parties were
satisfied with the hybrid approach and urged the FCC to leave it alone.301 They
viewed its flexibility as protective because it ensured that the incidental use of
communications would not trigger common carrier regulation.302

mostly from data services and equipment providers such as the Independent Data
Communications Manufacturing Association, Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, North American Telephone Association, and TDX Systems. Opposition of
United Tel. Sys. to Petition for Reconsideration at 2, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. Aug. 4,
1980) (summarizing petitions).
296. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
297. See sources cited supra note 247 and accompanying text.
298. Computer II Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 72–75. The FCC concluded,
however, that these carriers’ relatively small size limited these concerns. See id. at 74.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 85–87.
300. Cannon, supra note 3, at 181; Farrell & Weiser, supra note 87, at 130 (noting a
“stream of cases that ultimately led the FCC” to initiate a new proceeding).
301. McDonnell Douglas wanted “clear cut assurance” that replacing the hybrid category
with two mutually exclusive definitions (e.g., communications versus data) would not result
in greater regulation of their data practices. Comments of McDonnell Douglas at 3, Computer
II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. June 6, 1977). Seattle First National Bank claimed that the FCC’s
definitions would be “intolerable” without the flexibility of the hybrid category. Comments of
Seattle First National Bank at 5, 17–18, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. May 16, 1977); see
also Comments of Comsat Gen. Corp. at 4–5, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. June 6, 1977);
Comments of GTE Telenet at 2–3, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. June 6, 1977); Computer
II Tentative Decision, supra note 21, at 379–80 (“The strongest criticisms levied against the
proposed revisions . . . center around the elimination of the hybrid service categories . . . .”).
302. Comments of Aeronautical Radio, Inc. at 3, 7, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. June
6, 1977).
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The comments also contradict the argument that Computer I’s rules had imposed
excessive administrative costs on the FCC. Xerox explicitly stated that the FCC has
“not been flooded with requests to resolve such issues.”303 GTE Telenet (an early
packet-switching service) explained that the FCC had applied the Computer I rules
in only two cases since 1971—both of which involved carrier-provided services.304
In fact, there is a not a single instance of the Computer I rules being applied adversely
against a noncarrier “hybrid” service during this time—despite repeated requests.305
A more likely proximate cause of the Computer II proceeding was not a frustration
with hybrid services but with AT&T’s new Dataspeed terminal—a device that
blurred the line between communications and data equipment. The Department of
Justice’s 1956 consent decree had limited AT&T to providing only
“communications” equipment (e.g., telephones, telex terminals).306 It could not
manufacture or sell data processing devices such as computers. AT&T could,
however, sell advanced types of communications devices such as teletype machines,
which allowed users to send written messages (similar to telegrams or even e-mail)
over telephone lines.307
In 1974, AT&T pushed the envelope by introducing its new Dataspeed
terminal.308 While the terminals themselves did not contain much processing ability,
they provided access to a separate computer and thus functioned similarly to a
computer from the user’s perspective.309 Companies like IBM challenged the device,
arguing that AT&T was attempting to provide data processing equipment in violation
of the 1956 consent decree.310 The FCC, however, ultimately approved the device,
finding it incidental to communications and thus legal.311 This dispute directly
inspired Computer II according to the Department of Justice in its comments.312 The
Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users similarly claimed that Computer II was a
“review” of the FCC’s earlier Dataspeed decision.313 In releasing the initial

303. Comments of Xerox at 6, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. June 12, 1980).
304. These proceedings involved AT&T’s Dataspeed terminal and Western Union’s Sicom
message-switching service. Comments of GTE Telenet at 3, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C.
June 6, 1977).
305. Id. at 18 (noting that the FCC in six years had “not once directed an unregulated
entity submit to Title II regulation . . . despite the fact that it has received a number of
requests to do so”).
306. Computer II Supp. Notice, supra note 21, at 771, 779 n.24.
307. Interdependence of Communications and Data Processing: An Alternative Proposal
for the Second Computer Inquiry, supra note 54, at 321–22; see also Dataspeed Order, supra
note 23, at 22–24; BROCK, supra note 2, at 175–76.
308. Dataspeed Order, supra note 23, at 21.
309. See id. at 23–27; see also Bonica, supra note 24, at 59–72 (describing the
circumstances surrounding the Dataspeed decision); Samet, supra note 240, at 84–87.
310. See Dataspeed Order, supra note 23, at 26–27; Interdependence of Communications
and Data Processing: An Alternative Proposal for the Second Computer Inquiry, supra note
54, at 334.
311. Dataspeed Order, supra note 23, at 29–30.
312. Comments of the Dep’t of Justice at 2, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. May 26,
1977).
313. Comments of Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users at 2, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. May
16, 1977).
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Computer II notice, one FCC commissioner noted that AT&T’s Dataspeed terminal
created a “watershed” question.314 And indeed, Dataspeed was one of the first issues
mentioned in the Computer II Supplemental Notice a year later.315 These references
to the link between Dataspeed and Computer II are also consistent with the
contemporary legal literature.316
In addition, Computer II’s definition of “enhanced” services helped AT&T enter
new data and equipment markets. The FCC adopted these definitions in the shadow
of the Department of Justice’s 1956 consent decree, which limited AT&T to
“communications” services. The Computer II definition, however, used the term
“enhanced,” which encompassed both communications and data services. Because
enhanced services and equipment could be “communications” or “incidental” to
communications, AT&T would be free to offer them.317 In short, Computer II’s
definition erased the wall that had quarantined AT&T from data markets.318
Several contemporary parties criticized Computer II on these precise grounds,
alleging that it implicitly repealed the 1956 consent decree.319 GTE Telenet was
particularly critical: “A proceeding begun . . . for the ostensible purpose of
fine-tuning [definitions] . . . has become the vehicle for an ultra vires and manifestly
incorrect interpretation of the 1956 Consent Decree.”320 The Computer and
Communications Industry Association (CCIA) argued that Computer II illegally
modified the consent decree.321 MCI wrote that “the Decision authorizes the
provision by AT&T of data processing services.”322 It claimed the FCC’s entire
motivation for establishing separate resale entities (for facility-owning carriers) was
to benefit AT&T. This desire to help AT&T, however, had unintended consequences.

314. Computer II Notice, supra note 21, at 111–12 (Hooks, Comm’r, concurring).
315. Computer II Supp. Notice, supra note 21, at 771.
316. See Bonica, supra note 24, at 73; Samet, supra note 240, at 74–75, 87.
317. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 490–95 (interpreting the consent
decree’s exception for services “incidental” to communications as “allowing AT&T to engage
in the provision of various enhanced services”); Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note
21, at 424–32 (“[W]e believe the time has come to focus on the exception . . . which exempts
. . . ‘businesses or services incidental to . . . common carrier communications services.’”); see
also Comments of AT&T at 11–13, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. June 6, 1977) (arguing
for a broad definition of “communication” in order to provide innovative communications
services); Comments of Delphi at 8, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. Oct. 1, 1979) (stating
that the FCC’s “purpose obviously is to expand the scope of traditional common carrier
services” to help carriers); Interdependence of Communications and Data Processing: An
Alternative Proposal for the Second Computer Inquiry, supra note 54, at 333 (explaining
AT&T’s expansive interpretation).
318. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing the “quarantine” created by
Computer I).
319. See Computer II Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 106–07; Computer II Final
Decision, supra note 10, at 491–92.
320. Petition for Reconsideration of GTE Telenet at 1, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C.
June 12, 1980).
321. Petition for Reconsideration of CCIA at 32, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. June 12,
1980) (alleging that the FCC’s decision is “tantamount to agency modification” of the consent
decree”); Comments of CCIA at 18–19, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. Oct. 2, 1979).
322. Comments of MCI at 2, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. Oct. 2, 1979).
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Specifically, it resulted in a “harsh sanction against the specialized common carriers
for owning rather than leasing their facilities.”323
The FCC’s controversial extension of ancillary jurisdiction over enhanced
services also benefited AT&T’s potential expansion. In the Final Decision, the FCC
deregulated enhanced services but affirmed that it retained jurisdiction over them.324
Several parties critiqued this position, claiming the FCC was illegally expanding its
authority to data services.325 The reality, however, was that this decision helped
facilitate AT&T’s potential expansion into new data and terminal markets. As stated
earlier, “enhanced” services included both data and communications components.326
The Communications Act, however, arguably required the FCC to regulate any
communications service.327 Indeed, AT&T itself initially opposed deregulating
enhanced services because it might threaten its ability to provide them.328
The FCC solved the puzzle with a neat trick—it deregulated via new regulation.
More specifically, by extending ancillary jurisdiction to enhanced services, the FCC
could plausibly claim that it was in fact regulating enhanced communications
services.329 The FCC concluded that “[s]o long as the service is not wholly data
processing and devoid of any communications elements, the [FCC’s] jurisdiction
reaches it.”330 CBEMA made the point more explicitly: “This broad jurisdiction is
asserted in order to fashion a basis upon which AT&T can participate in the
deregulated enhanced services market.”331 AT&T, however, defended the FCC’s
extension of jurisdiction. It wrote that Computer II is “not deregulating[,] nor is it
authorizing the Bell System to provide services outside the scope of communications
as contemplated by the [1956] Decree.”332
The FCC Commissioners’ statements provide further evidence of the motivation
to help AT&T. Commissioner Quello wrote that Computer II is a “first step along
the road to full participation of AT&T and GTE in the provision of ‘enhanced’
telecommunications services.”333 Commissioner Ferris suggested that the
deregulation of enhanced services was an attempt to allow AT&T to expand while
preventing competitors from being “ensnarled in needless regulation.”334 Because of

323. Id. at 2–3. MCI was writing after the Computer II Tentative Decision in which the
FCC originally proposed applying the resale structural separation to all carriers.
324. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 435.
325. Computer II Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 91–92, 100–01.
326. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
327. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 450.
328. Reply Comments of AT&T on Tentative Decision at 47–50, Computer II, No. 20828
(F.C.C. Dec. 7, 1979). Regulation also potentially raised the costs of entry for competitive
providers of communications services.
329. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 492–93 (explaining that deregulation
of enhanced services and CPE “does not . . . foreclose AT&T from providing either CPE or
enhanced services”) (“[T]he record supports our belief that both enhanced services and CPE
are within our subject matter jurisdiction . . . .”).
330. Id. at 494.
331. Response of CBEMA at 7, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. Aug. 4, 1980).
332. Opposition of AT&T to Petitions for Reconsideration at 20–25, Computer II, No.
20828 (F.C.C. Aug. 4, 1980) [hereinafter AT&T 1980 Opposition].
333. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 503 (Quello, Comm’r, concurring).
334. Id. at 500 (Ferris, Comm’r, separate statement).
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Computer II, “AT&T will be able to participate aggressively in markets where our
traditional regulation is being withdrawn.”335 Commissioner Washburn opened his
statement by noting the benefits to AT&T: “I heartily approve today’s action which
will enable AT&T and GTE to actively participate in the dynamic new technologies
of the future.”336 Commissioner Jones also opened her statement explaining that “I
firmly believe that it is in the public interest that AT&T and GTE be allowed to
participate actively . . . .”337
These statements undermine the claim that the Computer II regime aimed
primarily to impose constraints upon AT&T and incumbent carriers more generally.
If so, AT&T—the dominant carrier of its day—seemed quite pleased with the
result.338 In the litigation challenging Computer II, many attacked the FCC for
relaxing these requirements and enabling AT&T to expand into new markets.339
AT&T’s brief, however, defended each of the FCC’s decisions, including the
structural separation and unbundling requirements.340
The conclusion that Computer II attempted to help AT&T is, somewhat ironically,
consistent with the FCC’s strong language about the importance of using regulatory
protections to prevent bottleneck control of key facilities.341 At the time, some parties
challenged the remaining restrictions on AT&T as too severe. For instance,
Commissioner Jones argued that she was “not . . . satisfied that the degree of
separation . . . is justified . . . .”342 Fearing legal challenges, the FCC needed to
establish a record to justify the continuing structural separation requirements. More
speculatively, the FCC may have adopted strong language as a way to emphasize the
remaining regulatory protections and to preempt criticism that Computer II was
motivated to help AT&T. In any event, the FCC’s language should not obscure the
larger point that Computer II aimed to secure AT&T’s ability to enter competitive
new markets for data services and terminal equipment.
****
In sum, the literature does not adequately reflect important aspects of Computer
Inquiries’ history. One question, then, is why? One explanation is simply that the
FCC addressed many of these important issues outside of the Computer Inquiries
proceedings. From their outset, both the Computer I and Computer II proceedings
omitted issues regarding network adequacy and carrier tariffs restrictions.343 Because

335. Id. at 503.
336. Id. at 504 (Washburn, Comm’r, concurring).
337. Id. at 520 (Jones, Comm’r, dissenting in part).
338. AT&T 1980 Opposition, supra note 332, at 2 (noting AT&T’s general support for the
Computer II Final Decision despite its filing of a limited petition for reconsideration).
339. See Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(“The most fundamental challenge to the Computer II decision is the claim that the [FCC] has
impermissibly deregulated enhanced services . . . .”).
340. Brief of Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.-Intervenors at 17–24, Computer & Commc’ns Indus.
Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, (D.C. Cir. 1982) (No. 80-147).
341. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 466–69.
342. Id. at 521 (Jones, Comm’r, dissenting in part).
343. See Computer II Notice, supra note 21, at 103 n.2; supra text accompanying notes 44–45.
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the subsequent Computer Inquiries orders did not discuss them, they are less likely
to be reflected in literature that relies on those orders.
Another possibility is that the open access debates of the late 1990s and early
2000s transformed Computer Inquiries.344 The Internet initially developed on the
telephone network, where traditional norms and laws had created a sharp division
between physical transmission and higher-layer content. Dial-up service, for
instance, relied heavily on the telephone lines of regulated Title II carriers.345 It was
easy to take this divide for granted until new technologies—particularly cable
broadband—put pressure on the traditional regime.346
For cable companies who wanted to resist common carrier rules, Computer II’s
deregulation provided a helpful analogy. From their perspective, Computer II
deregulated enhanced services because they integrated communications and data
components. Cable broadband, some argued, similarly combined transmission and
information into one undifferentiated enhanced service (or “information service,”
using today’s nomenclature).347 Because the physical transmission component could
not be individually isolated, the entire service should be deregulated just as it was in
Computer II.
Other parties, however, strongly favored applying traditional regulation to cable
broadband access. To them, the physical network should remain open and
nondiscriminatory to promote innovation and entry. Otherwise, owners of physical
facilities—that is, cable and telephone companies—would have too much power
over companies (such as internet service providers and content providers) who
required access to the physical infrastructure.348
For these critics of deregulation, Computer II’s unbundling regime provided a
helpful analogy.349 Under Computer II, carriers had to isolate the basic physical
transmission service and make it available to all other entities on a nondiscriminatory
basis. By analogy, they argued, cable companies should provide “open access” to its
physical infrastructure to any competitive ISP—including the hundreds of dial-ups

344. Another policy dispute that potentially caused a transformation of Computer II
involved AT&T’s frame relay service. See Cannon, supra note 3, at 189–90.
345. See Harold Feld, Whose Line Is It Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable Open
Access, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23, 25–26 (2000).
346. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 33, at 192–96.
347. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable & Other Facilities, 17
FCC Rcd. 4798, 4818–19, 4824–27 (2002) (stating that cable broadband is a “single,
integrated information service”), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Brand X Internet Servs.
v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Nat’l Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
348. See John T. Nakahata, Regulating Information Platforms: The Challenge of
Rewriting Communications Regulation from the Bottom Up, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH.
L. 95, 115–16 (2002).
349. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet Access, 22
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2008) (noting literature that cites Computer Inquiries as justification
for open access and network neutrality regulations); Letter from Vint Cerf, Senior Vice
President Internet Architecture and Tech., WorldCom, to Donald Evans, Sec’y of Commerce,
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access 2 (May 20, 2002) (“This policy of
nondiscriminatory treatment was established back in the late 1970s in the so-called Computer
Inquiry proceedings . . . .”).
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that existed at the time.350 This debate became known as the open access debate, but
it ultimately evolved into the more modern network neutrality debate. In short,
Computer Inquiries provided helpful analogies to all parties. And it is likely not a
coincidence that Robert Cannon’s seminal article on Computer Inquiries’ legacy was
published in 2002 at the height of the open access debates.351
IV. WHY IT MATTERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN POLICY AND THE LITERATURE
This Part explains why the pre-Internet’s history is relevant to modern policy
debates and the current literature. First, the history illustrates that government
interventions were both necessary to the rise of the Internet and were more extensive
than the current literature often acknowledges. In particular, it illustrates the long
tradition of regulating uncompetitive physical network layers—and thus has
important parallels with the modern network neutrality debate. Second, the history
illustrates that the FCC possesses a diverse and interrelated set of policy levers for
encouraging a competitive environment. In this respect, the focus on network
neutrality may be obscuring other equally important policy levers that can protect the
open Internet.
A. The Public Origins of the Pre-Internet
The first lesson of the pre-Internet’s history is that government mattered. It
therefore challenges the commonly held view that the Internet’s growth relied on a
“light touch” deregulatory approach.352 Specifically, the Internet’s growth depended
on a series of pro-competitive regulatory efforts that created a salubrious
environment for data services to grow and evolve. While some scholars have
recognized the importance of such regulatory efforts,353 the pre-Internet proceedings
provide additional concrete examples of how the FCC’s intervention fueled the
growth of the Internet’s ancestral data networks. Without regulatory intervention,

350. Earl W. Comstock & John W. Butler, Access Denied: The FCC’s Failure to
Implement Open Access to Cable as Required by the Communications Act, 8 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 5, 11–13 (2000).
351. See Cannon, supra note 3.
352. See, e.g., Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, 24 FCC Rcd.
13064, 13159 (2009) (McDowell, Comm’r, dissenting in part) (notice of proposed
rulemaking) (“[T]he Internet is perhaps the greatest deregulatory success story of all time.”);
Comments of the National Cable & Telecommunications Assoc. at 2–3, Preserving the Open
Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, No. 09-191 (F.C.C. Jan. 14, 2010) (outlining the
FCC’s deregulatory policy of “vigilant restraint”); Comments of Comcast Corporation at i,
Framework for Broadband Internet Service, No. 10-127 (F.C.C. July 15, 2010) (noting the
FCC’s “longstanding, bipartisan, consensus, ‘light-touch’ policy approach to regulating
broadband Internet service”).
353. Bickerstaff, supra note 70, at 6 (noting the success of the “series of [FCC] regulatory
decisions” to computer industry and the Internet); Cannon, supra note 3, at 180 (praising the
“history of the FCC taking affirmative and aggressive regulation of communications networks,
specifically for the benefit of the computer networks”); Werbach, supra note 84, at 8, 14
(“FCC regulation has advanced the development of the computer industry and its illustrious
stepchild, the Internet.”).
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carriers’ tariffs would have stymied the growth of innovative data services and
equipment. Instead, the FCC accelerated technological innovation by promoting
entry, introducing competitive pressure, and securing rights of interconnection,
equipment attachment, resale, and line sharing.354 It also followed through to protect
these reforms in the face of evasion and hostile state regulators.
In addition, the FCC’s regulatory efforts focused almost exclusively on the
uncompetitive physical-layer services, which at that time meant the incumbent
telephone network facilities. In this respect, the pre-Internet proceedings provide a
better example of layered regulation than Computer Inquiries itself. In virtually all
of the pre-Internet proceedings, the FCC intervened against the uncompetitive
physical layer to promote competition in higher-layer markets that relied on physical
network access as a necessary input.
Accordingly, the FCC’s pre-Internet proceedings illustrate market-creating
regulation, as opposed to more traditional command and control, New Deal-style
regulation. The Carterfone proceeding, for instance, helped create new cars by
guaranteeing access to the roads. Specifically, it regulated the uncompetitive physical
layer to generate growth for the equipment and private networks attached to it.355
Similarly, the resale and line sharing reforms also helped new data services that relied
upon physical network services.356 Liberalizing entry for specialized common
carriers achieved these same goals through market pressure at the physical layer.357
This history has several implications for modern debates, particularly the current
network neutrality debate. First, it illustrates the long and successful history of
pro-market regulation of uncompetitive physical access infrastructure. In this
respect, it bolsters the normative arguments for network neutrality (or “Open
Internet”) regulation to prevent discrimination by lower-layer access providers
against higher-layer content and applications.
Indeed, the current case for nondiscrimination protections is even stronger given
that today’s Internet access market increasingly resembles the monopoly telephone
era. As Susan Crawford has persuasively argued, high-speed broadband has
effectively become a cable monopoly.358 While numerous cable companies exist,
customers generally only have access to one in a local area. Accordingly, modern
applications that require higher speeds depend on cable infrastructure as completely
as data services once depended on AT&T and incumbent carriers. The pre-Internet
history thus challenges those who claim the earlier history is irrelevant because it
involved traditional monopoly telephone networks.359 The pre-Internet proceedings

354. See supra Part II.
355. See supra Part II.C.3.
356. See supra Part II.C.4.
357. See supra Part II.C.1–2.
358. Susan P. Crawford, The Looming Cable Monopoly, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA
(Jun. 1, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/looming-cable-monopoly
[https://perma.cc/7U7Y-63MM]; Author: When It Comes to High-Speed Internet, U.S.
‘Falling Way Behind’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 6, 2014, 2:47 PM), http://www.npr.org
/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/02/06/272480919/when-it-comes-to-high-speed-internet-u-s
-falling-way-behind [https://perma.cc/7A3G-LYJY].
359. Fred Campbell, for instance, argues that the divide between telecommunications and
information services is “premised on the existence of the PSTN [publicly switched telephone
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(and Computer Inquiries, for that matter) focused on competitiveness, not
technology. Throughout these historical proceedings, commenters urged the FCC to
focus on economics rather than specific technology in adopting rules. Commenters
argued that monopoly carriers should be regulated more heavily than
competitive-resale and private-line competitors who lacked pricing power, even
though they often used identical technologies.360 And indeed, both the Resale Order
and the Computer II Final Decision ultimately reflected this approach.361
More precisely, the pre-Internet history strengthens the normative case for the
FCC’s recent decision to isolate and “reclassify” broadband access as a Title II
service.362 As noted earlier, critics claim isolating the physical layer for regulation
would be practically impossible and would create regulatory disparity.363
The history of the pre-Internet, however, undermines these critiques. Specifically,
it illustrates the long tradition of separating physical transmission service from
higher-layer information services for regulatory purposes. For instance, when the
FCC deregulated “enhanced services” because these services inextricably combined
data and communications functions, it was referring only to services that built upon
basic regulated transmission. Some parties today, however, interpret this language as
applying to the entire network—including physical transmission.364 Such arguments,
however, ignore the key background assumptions of Computer Inquiries’ decisions
and the pre-Internet proceedings more broadly. Indeed, the history of AT&T’s
control over the telephone network is a cautionary tale for those who would give
private companies excessive control over vital communications infrastructure.
B. A Diverse Toolkit for Enforcement
A separate implication, however, is that protecting the open Internet is more
complicated than it looks. The rise of the pre-Internet depended not merely upon

network].” Thus, services not connected have been unregulated. Campbell, supra note 287;
see also Notice of Proposed Rule Making ¶35, Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access,
No. 02-33 (F.C.C. Feb. 15, 2002) (“[T]he core assumption underlying the Computer Inquiries
was that the telephone network is the primary, if not exclusive, means through which
information service providers can obtain access to customers.”).
360. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 21, at 368–71 (noting that comments
suggested focusing “on defining monopoly and competitive services” rather than “the
distinction between data processing and communications”); see also Comments of S. Pac.
Commc’ns Co. at 1–2, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. Oct. 2, 1979) (arguing against
restrictions on nondominant carriers); Comments of ISA Commc’n Servs. at 10–11, Computer
II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. June 6, 1977) (arguing that maximum separation should not apply to
nonmonopoly resale carriers); Comments of S. Pac. Commc’ns Co. at 4–6, Computer II, No.
20828 (F.C.C. June 6, 1977) (arguing maximum separation should not apply to nonmonopoly
carriers); Comments of W. Union at 11–13, Computer II, No. 20828 (F.C.C. June 6, 1977)
(arguing it should be subject to less regulation because it did not provide monopoly services).
361. See supra text accompanying notes 226–29.
362. Jon Brodkin, FCC Votes for Net Neutrality, a Ban on Paid Fast Lanes, and Title II,
ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 26, 2015, 12:59 PM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/02/fcc-votes
-for-net-neutrality-a-ban-on-paid-fast-lanes-and-title-ii/ [https://perma.cc/76T7-VYJK].
363. See supra text accompanying notes 286–87.
364. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
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government action per se, but upon a diverse set of interrelated proceedings.365 For
similar reasons, creating an open and competitive environment today will depend on
several interrelated policy levers—and the political will to enforce them. In this
respect, the pre-Internet history illustrates the diverse toolkit that the FCC possesses
to achieve the goals of better, faster, and cheaper broadband service.
Network neutrality is one important component of that toolkit, but it is not the
only one. For instance, even with strong network neutrality rules, low-income and
rural areas would still need greater access to high-speed broadband.366 New video
applications could also be strangled by data caps, discriminatory peering agreements,
or simply a lack of capacity. Wireless broadband would still need greater spectrum
allocations (particularly of unlicensed spectrum) and more affordable special access
services.367 In short, network neutrality—like Computer Inquiries before it—is not
the only game in town.
In this respect, perhaps the most specific policy lesson is the importance of
creating competition—or at least credible competitive threats—at the physical layer.
Liberalizing entry for new competitive carriers was arguably the FCC’s most
important contribution to early data networks. These carriers threatened AT&T’s
overpriced private and business line services. And even if the new carriers did not
always survive, the credible threat of competition led AT&T to improve its network
and reform its services in ways that ultimately benefited data services and facilitated
the Internet’s rise. In this sense, competition created significant spillover benefits for
everyone that relied on the telephone network for data services.368
Competitive entry in today’s broadband access markets could create similar
positive externalities. Competition, however, is notoriously difficult to create
because of the significant barriers to entry that competitive access providers must
overcome.369 Broadband networks exhibit natural monopoly characteristics, and
cable broadband enjoys a functional monopoly for higher-speed broadband
service.370 As a result, cable broadband is both too expensive and too slow relative
to the broadband services enjoyed in several other countries.371
One potential candidate, then, for competitive entry today is municipal broadband
networks. Given the high barriers of entry, city and state governments have

365. I thank Harold Feld for clarifying this point through email correspondence.
366. See, e.g., Lee Rainie, The State of Digital Divides, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 5, 2013),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/11/05/the-state-of-digital-divides-video-slides/ [https://perma.cc
/T8GB-VUXX].
367. For an example of the need for innovative spectrum policies, see Jessica Rosenworcel,
Comm’r, Fed. Comm’cns Comm’n, Remarks at 4G Americas Technology Briefing (Oct. 14,
2014), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-329909A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/45RN-EUAP].
368. On the concept of spillovers, see generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley,
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).
369. See Whitt, supra note 77, at 432–36.
370. SUSAN P. CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY
POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 113 (2013).
371. John Aziz, Why Is American Internet So Slow?, WEEK (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://theweek.com/article/index/257404/why-is-american-internet-so-slow [https://perma.cc
/UC9U-2SBK].
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significant financial advantages over private companies in constructing new
networks. In addition to being able to raise money through taxes or bonds,
government networks would not necessarily have to earn a profit as quickly—or at
all. Many states, however, have recently passed laws that prevent municipalities from
developing broadband networks.372 These incumbent protection statutes are harmful
not merely because they prevent the rise of new networks, but because they eliminate
the threat of competitive entry. With these statutes in place, municipalities cannot
threaten to develop their own networks if cable providers refuse to lower prices or
enhance service offerings. The FCC, however, could help municipal networks grow
by preempting these protectionist statutes.
Another policy lesson that the pre-Internet history provides is that public
disclosure and transparency can be an effective check on network owners. Indeed,
this Article contends that the most important legacy of Computer Inquiries was not
its rules, but its role as a source of information for contemporary tariff proceedings.
The proceedings not only “shamed” AT&T to make changes, but they also provided
an institutional forum for the public to organize and air grievances about the current
state of network services.
Disclosure could serve a similar function for broadband access regulation
today.373 While not sufficient on its own, disclosure could provide an important
check on access providers regardless of the statutory authority the FCC ultimately
chooses for network neutrality rules. In fact, disclosure would be even more effective
in the age of social media where concerns can be publicized quickly and at little cost.
In this respect, disclosure allows the FCC to crowdsource its oversight of access
providers. The very existence of the disclosure requirement would also deter access
providers from engaging in misconduct in the first place, much like the warrant
requirement preemptively deters police misconduct.
A separate lesson that the pre-Internet history provides is the importance of public
engagement to opening the telephone network to new advanced services. Admittedly,
this transition had several sources. Technological innovation played an important
role, as did the FCC’s legal choices that accelerated those developments. However,
one important motivation for the FCC’s discretionary actions was the public pressure
and engagement from a diverse range of stakeholders.
Public engagement will be especially important to facilitate municipal broadband
projects and other competitive private entrants such as Google Fiber.374 In Georgia,
for instance, a coalition of public interest groups, municipal governments, and tech
companies resisted efforts of the state legislature to limit municipalities’ ability to

372. Jon Brodkin, ISP Lobby Has Already Won Limits on Public Broadband in 20 States,
ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 12, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/02/isp
-lobby-has-already-won-limits-on-public-broadband-in-20-states/ [https://perma.cc/X424
-ENRT].
373. The FCC’s 2010 open Internet rules included a requirement that access providers
publicly disclose their network management policies. The D.C. Circuit upheld this
requirement. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The FCC included
disclosure requirements in its newer proposed rules. Protecting and Promoting the Open
Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, 5584–93 (2014).
374. A Different Kind of Internet and TV, supra note 19.
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establish public broadband networks.375 These efforts required local communities to
realize the benefits that competition could provide in terms of quality and pricing. In
this respect, the Georgia coalition could provide a blueprint for future organizing
efforts.
One particularly important stakeholder is the business community. Indeed,
American businesses played an important role in the pre-Internet’s rise by
publicizing the problems with AT&T’s networks and advocating for tariff reforms.376
This community included a diverse coalition that included airlines, banks, energy
companies, transportation companies, equipment manufacturers, retail
manufacturing companies, and newspaper organizations to name a few. These parties
recognized their interest in cheaper and better networks that would allow them to
offer and benefit from new types of data services and terminal equipment. Further,
the FCC’s tariff reforms had a dynamic effect upon this coalition. By reducing the
costs of competitive entry, public pressure helped create entirely new companies and
industries that could, in turn, exert even more pressure upon policymakers.377 This
pressure provided an important balance to the weight of AT&T, which had both
considerable resources and long experience influencing policymakers.
The implication for today is that the business community could play a similarly
important role in modern broadband access debates. Much like the companies
participating in Computer Inquiries, the business community would benefit from
open networks that are as fast and cheap as possible. Unlike that time, however, the
business community has greater ideological aversion to regulation than existed in the
era of Computer Inquiries. Although tech companies such as Google and Netflix
have actively supported open Internet protections,378 much of the general business
community has stayed on the sidelines or actively opposed regulations through
representatives such as the Chamber of Commerce.379 Indeed, until recently, even
many tech companies that more clearly depend on nondiscriminatory access have
often been silent or offered only half-hearted support through ad hoc organizations.
The modern debate thus lacks the adversarial relationship between business
customers and carriers that was so vital in the Computer Inquiries and tariff
proceedings.

375. Timothy B. Lee, Georgia House Rejects Bill To Ban Municipal Fiber Networks, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 8, 2013, 12:33 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/03/georgia
-house-rejects-bill-to-ban-municipal-fiber-networks/ [https://perma.cc/3TC3-D2S8]; Baily
McCann, Google Joins Opposition to Georgia Bill Limiting Municipal Broadband,
CIVSOURCE (Feb. 9, 2012), https://civsourceonline.com/2012/02/09/google-joins-opposition
-to-georgia-bill-limiting-municipal-broadband [https://perma.cc/NX95-D9WQ].
376. Nolan, supra note 108, at 12–13 (listing businesses and industries supporting
competitive policies).
377. BROCK, supra note 2, at 20.
378. Brian Fung, Google, Netflix Lead Nearly 150 Tech Companies in Protest of FCC Net
Neutrality Plan, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (May 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/05/07/google-netflix-lead-nearly-150-tech-companies-in-protest-of
-fcc-net-neutrality-plan/ [https://perma.cc/KTK4-E7M2].
379. See Comments of U.S. Chamber of Commerce at 1–3, Protecting & Promoting the
Open Internet, No. 14-28 (F.C.C. July 15, 2014) (opposing Title II reclassification); Reply
Comments of U.S. Chamber of Commerce at 1–2, Preserving the Open Internet, No. 09-191
(F.C.C. Apr. 26, 2010).
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A final lesson the pre-Internet history provides is the importance of the FCC’s
discretionary enforcement. During the 1960s and 1970s, the specific content of the
governing statutes and regulations was arguably less important than the FCC’s
discretionary commitment to policy goals—and the public’s willingness to demand
oversight. For instance, telephone carriers discriminated against competitors for
years despite being subject to extensive Title II regulation. Similarly, the celebrated
Computer I and Computer II rules alone would have provided only limited protection
against restrictions relating to interconnection, equipment attachment, resale and line
sharing. Change occurred only when the FCC decided to use its statutory authority
in a new way. Indeed, the FCC’s mere opening of these proceedings protected data
services by generating information, creating pressure for reforms, and imposing
checks on the carriers.
The larger point is that the content of the FCC’s statutory authority may prove
less important ultimately than its enforcement priorities.380 Even if courts ultimately
reject reclassification, the FCC’s alternative source of statutory authority (Section
706381) provides substantive authority to make credible enforcement threats for a
wide range of actions. Using this authority, the FCC could not only implement rules,
it could initiate investigations and enforcement actions for several types of harmful
conduct that potentially threatens innovation such as discriminatory data caps,
interconnection and peering agreements, municipal broadband restrictions, and
overbroad congestion management practices. Indeed, merely initiating the
proceedings—and drawing public attention to these practices—would itself be an
important political check and a reinforcement of nondiscriminatory norms. The
flipside of this lesson is that reclassification will provide little protection without the
FCC’s political willingness to enforce its rules.
C. Addressing Objections
The rise of data networks and the Internet had many causes. Computer Inquiries
is part of that story, but overemphasizing its role can obscure the contributions of
other forces that helped make these changes possible. One potential objection,
however, is that this Article focuses too heavily on the developments that led to
Computer Inquiries rather than looking at what followed. For instance, one might
argue that Computer Inquiries was important for the Internet’s subsequent
development in the 1980s and 1990s. Further, to the extent Computer Inquiries
reflected preexisting norms, it nonetheless played an important role in reinforcing
and solidifying those norms in ways that further facilitated the Internet’s growth.
To be clear, Computer Inquiries’ rules were not irrelevant to the growth of the
Internet. This Article, however, provides a corrective to modern assessments of its
relative causal effects. The broader history illustrates that the key legal choices and
the market growth that led to the Internet were largely in place prior to the final

380. Kevin Werbach & Phil Weiser, The Perfect and the Good on Network Neutrality,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2014, 6:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-werbach
/network-neutrality_b_5221780.html [https://perma.cc/W8GV-CQWP] (“The effectiveness
of the FCC proposal in protecting the open Internet thus depends on how it’s enforced . . . .”).
381. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 706 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1302
(2012)).
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Computer II rules in 1980. While Computer Inquiries may well have reinforced those
developments, they were not the germinating source of the change as the literature
often implies. The rules alone would have been ineffective without the sustained
oversight and enforcement proceedings that the FCC imposed during this time.
Further, it is difficult to isolate the subsequent effects of Computer Inquiries from
other contemporary developments. Most importantly, the divestiture of AT&T
occurred at approximately the same time the Computer II rules were intended to go
into effect. This action resulted in a structural separation of the local Bell companies
from the more competitive long-distance and terminal equipment divisions, which
retained the name “AT&T.” Under the modified final judgment (MFJ), the local Bell
monopolies were forbidden from offering information services (an updated term for
“enhanced” services) and were subject to various nondiscrimination requirements.382
The protections were far more extensive and lasting than Computer II, which had
actually attempted to relax regulation in important respects. In this respect, the MFJ
altered and amplified the Computer Inquiries regime that preceded it.
Finally, space limitations prevent pursuing other important factors that should be
addressed in future research. For instance, the growing ideological embrace of
competition played an important role in the history of data networks. Relatedly, the
contingent choices of reform-minded FCC officials, such as Bernard Strassburg at the
Common Carrier Bureau, also deserve more attention than they received here. Finally,
more should also be said about the third proceeding in the mid-1980s—Computer
III.383 The influence of this proceeding is more difficult to measure. For one, federal
courts invalidated much of the Computer III rules, and the complex proceedings
dragged on for many years.384 In addition, Computer III takes place in the shadow of
the AT&T divestiture as the FCC tried to relax structural separation requirements.385
While the influence of Computer III on the Internet’s development deserves more
attention, the first two proceedings are generally seen as creating the foundation for
data networks’ growth.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s primary argument is that the FCC played a critical role in building
the pre-Internet in ways the current literature overlooks. Although Computer
Inquiries gets much of the credit, the FCC’s more important contribution was its
regulatory interventions in the pre-Internet proceedings. It is difficult to square this
history with modern claims that the Internet’s growth depended on “light touch”
deregulatory measures. As the pre-Internet history illustrates, this latter claim is true
only with respect to higher-layer markets and services. These same markets,
however, simultaneously depended upon aggressive regulation at the noncompetitive

382. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 142–43 (D.D.C. 1982).
383. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commc’ns Rules & Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (report and order).
384. See Werbach, supra note 84, at 24–26.
385. Rebecca Arbogast, FCC’s Broadband Quartet: A State-Federal Fugue or Feud?, 2 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 245, 269–70 (2003); Marcellus S. Snow, Trade in Information
Services in Asia, ASEAN, and the Pacific: Conceptual Issues and Policy Examples, 28 CAL.
W. L. REV. 329, 338 (1992).
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physical layer. In this respect, the history of the pre-Internet lends normative support
not only for network neutrality rules in general, but for reclassification approaches
specifically.
The history of the FCC and the pre-Internet also illustrates the diverse toolkit of
policy levers that the agency possesses to protect an open and competitive
environment. Network neutrality rules—like the Computer II rules before them—are
only one part of that toolkit. While network neutrality is both important and
necessary, its dominance can obscure the importance—and availability—of these
other tools. For instance, efforts to create competitive pressures (e.g., municipal
broadband and Google Fiber) are particularly effective ways to increase speeds, fuel
innovation, and expand deployment. In any event, the future of the open Internet will
depend upon the FCC’s willingness to use a broad and interrelated set of policy levers
to enforce its priorities regardless of the rules it ultimately adopts.

